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1.1	  Background	  Agricultural	  production	  is	  associated	  with	  risks	  from	  all	  aspects.	  Producers	  generally	  face	  five	  types	  of	  risk:	  production	  risk,	  price	  or	  market	  risk,	  institutional	  risk,	  human	  or	  personal	  risk,	  and	  financial	  risk.	  (United	  States	  Department	  of	  Agriculture	  (USDA),	  Economic	   Research	   Service	   (ERS))	   The	   presence	   of	   the	   risks	   and	   uncertainties	   can	  cause	   wide	   fluctuations	   in	   farm	   income,	   which	   provides	   producers	   with	   strong	  incentives	  to	  manage	  risks.	  Producers	  have	  many	  options	  to	  address	  risks	  and	  reduce	  the	   impacts	   of	   uncertainty	   on	   farm	   income.	   Some	   of	   the	   widely	   utilized	   strategies	  include	  1)	  crop	  insurance,	  which	  is	  generally	  either	  yield-­‐based	  or	  revenue-­‐based;	  2)	  contracting—which	   may	   include	   marketing	   contracts	   (forward	   contracts)	   or	  production	   contracts,	   or	   hedging	   with	   futures/options,	   which	   mainly	   deals	   with	  potential	   adverse	   price	   changes;	   3)	   enterprise	   diversification	   that	   aims	   to	   reduce	  farm	  income	  risks	  by	  investing	  in	  more	  than	  one	  crop	  or	  livestock	  activity;	  and	  4)	  off-­‐farm	   employment	   or	   investment	   that	   seeks	   additional	   incomes	   from	   non-­‐farm	  sources	   to	   supplement	   income	   from	   farming.	   Most	   farmers	   do	   not	   solely	   adopt	   a	  single	   strategy;	   more	   commonly,	   they	   combine	   multiple	   strategies	   and	   the	   use	   of	  different	  strategies	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  related	   to	  each	  other.	   In	   this	  study,	   I	   focus	  on	   the	  interactions	  of	  crop	  insurance	  and	  marketing	  contracts,	  specifically	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  as	  well	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  production	  contracted.	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A	   marketing	   contract	   is	   an	   agreement	   between	   two	   parties	   before	   harvest,	   which	  specifies	   the	   price	   of	   a	   commodity	   or	   a	   mechanism	   for	   determining	   the	   price,	   a	  delivery	  outlet	  and	  a	  quantity	  to	  be	  delivered;	  cash	  forward	  contracts	  are	  one	  type	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  (USDA,	  ERS).	  Crop	  producers	  use	  marketing	  contracts	  to	  protect	  against	  adverse	  price	  changes	   in	  crops	  as	   it	  allows	  producers	   to	   lock	   in	  crop	  prices	  before	   the	  crop	   is	  marketable,	  while	   in	   that	  way	   it	  also	  eliminates	   the	  possibility	   to	  gain	   in	   case	   the	   prices	   go	   up.	   Additionally,	   a	  marketing	   contract	   can	   aid	   in	   getting	  loans	  as	  it	  provides	  farmers	  with	  assured	  market	  outlets	  for	  products	  and	  therefore	  reduces	  the	  default	  risk	  on	  loans;	  however,	  it	  may	  increase	  the	  costs	  of	  a	  production	  shortfall	  if	  the	  delivery	  obligation	  has	  to	  be	  met	  through	  purchases	  on	  spot	  markets	  at	  a	  price	  higher	  than	  the	  contract	  price.	  	  Crop	  insurance	  is	  a	  widely	  used	  risk	  management	  tool	  by	  U.S.	  producers	  to	  deal	  with	  crop	   yield	   and/or	   revenue	   risks.	   In	   purchasing	   a	   crop	   insurance	  policy,	   a	   producer	  selects	  a	  coverage	  level	  for	  an	  insurable	  crop	  and	  pays	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  premium—the	  rest	   of	   it	   is	   covered	   by	   the	   federal	   government.	   There	   are	   generally	   two	   types	   of	  policies:	  yield-­‐based	  and	  revenue-­‐based.	  For	  yield-­‐based	   insurance,	   an	   indemnity	   is	  triggered	  if	  the	  realized	  yield	  falls	  below	  a	  guaranteed	  yield	  level	  (determined	  by	  the	  producer’s	  actual	  production	  history	  and	  the	  chosen	  coverage	  level).	  Revenue-­‐based	  policies	  are	  indemnified	  when	  there	  is	  a	  revenue	  loss	  no	  matter	  whether	  it	  is	  caused	  by	  production	  shortfall	  or	  market	  price	  decrease.	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1.2	  Motivation,	  Objective	  and	  Significance	  Farmers’	  use	  of	   forward	  pricing	  and	  crop	  insurance	  are	  oftentimes	  not	   independent	  of	   each	   other.	   The	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   adoption	   on	   farmers’	   use	   of	   forward	  pricing	   can	   either	   be	   positive	   or	   be	   negative.	   A	   negative	   impact	   is	   suggestive	   of	   a	  “crowding	  out”	  effect	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  forward	  pricing,	  which	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  influence	   of	   Medicaid	   program	   on	   private	   health	   insurance	   found	   in	   previous	  literature.	  A	  positive	  effect,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  indicates	  that	  crop	  insurance	  facilitates	  forward	   marketing/contracting.	   Understanding	   the	   practical	   relationship	   between	  crop	  insurance	  adoption	  and	  farmers’	  use	  of	   forward	  pricing	  is	   important	  for	  policy	  makers	  to	  make	  effective	  policies	  on	  the	  promotion	  of	  risk	  management	  strategies.	  It	  is	  also	  useful	   for	  advisors,	  educators,	  and	  extension	  agents	  to	   tailor	   their	  marketing	  advice	  and	  educational/training	  programs	  to	  the	  specific	  needs	  of	  their	  client	  based	  on	  different	  insurance	  status.	  	  	  Most	  previous	  studies	  use	  optimal	  hedging	  models	  and	  mathematical	  simulations	  to	  explore	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   on	   forward	   pricing	   (mainly	   focus	   on	   hedging	  with	  futures).	  Results	  generally	  suggest	  that	  crop	  yield	  insurance	  and	  forward	  pricing	  are	   complementary,	   while	   crop	   revenue	   insurance	   substitutes	   for	   forward	   pricing.	  However,	  farmers’	  behaviors	  have	  found	  to	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  most	  of	  the	  models	  (Tomek	  and	  Peterson,	  2001).	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  little	  literature	  exists	  that	  empirically	  investigate	   farmers’	  actual	  behaviors	  when	  making	   forward	  pricing	  decisions	   in	   the	  presence	   of	   crop	   insurance,	   while	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   endogeneity	   of	   crop	  insurance	  adoption.	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The	   objective	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   empirically	   explore	   how	   farmers’	   use	   of	   crop	  insurance	   influences	   their	   demand	   for	   one	   form	   of	   forward	   pricing—marketing	  contract,	  which	   is	   essentially	   forward	  contracting.	  Using	  a	   linear	  probability	  model,	  this	  paper	  first	  examines	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  farmers’	  adoption	  decisions	  towards	  marketing	  contracts.	  Thereafter,	  the	  intensive	  margin	  is	  also	  analyzed	  using	  the	  same	  set	  of	  explanatory	  variables.	   Investigating	  whether	  crop	   insurance	  crowds	  out	   marketing	   contracts	   or	   is	   complementary	   to	   it	   should	   help	   enhance	   the	  understanding	   of	   farmers’	   risk	   managing	   behaviors,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   interactions	  between	  public	  and	  private-­‐market	   risk	  management	   tools	   in	  practice.	  The	   findings	  should	   be	   valuable	   to	   policy	   makers,	   consultants,	   farm-­‐related	   organizations	   and	  companies	   by	   providing	   useful	   information	   for	   estimating	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	  insurance	  policies	  on	  the	  private	  risk	  management	  market.	  Those	   findings	  may	  also	  be	  helpful	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  risk	  management	  instruments	  in	  regions	  or	  countries	  where	  agricultural	  risk	  management	  is	  less	  developed.	  	  	  
1.3	  Data	  and	  Methodology	  Data	  used	   in	   this	   study	  mainly	   come	   from	   two	   sources.	  The	  main	  data	  used	   in	   this	  study	  comes	  from	  the	  Agricultural	  Resource	  Management	  Survey	  (ARMS),	  which	  is	  an	  annual	  survey	  sponsored	  jointly	  by	  the	  National	  Agricultural	  Statistics	  Service	  (NASS)	  and	  the	  Economic	  Research	  Service	  (ERS)	  of	  the	  USDA.	  ARMS	  consists	  of	  three	  phases,	  detailed	   contracting	   information	   is	   drawn	   from	   the	   Phase	   III	   survey,	   which	   is	  conducted	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   the	   year	   following	   the	   reference	   year.	   (USDA,	   ERS)	   The	  ARMS	  data	  are	  not	  longitudinal.	  To	  allow	  for	  the	  examination	  of	  variation	  in	  farmers’	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behavior	  over	  time,	  I	  follow	  Cole	  and	  Kirwan’s	  (2009)	  approach	  and	  pool	  seven	  cross-­‐sectional	   datasets	   from	   2005	   to	   2011	   to	   create	   a	   pseudo-­‐panel,	   which	   contains	  148,136	   farms.	   The	   analysis	   of	   marketing	   contract	   decisions	   is	   conducted	   for	   two	  different	  samples—the	  “all	  farms”	  sample,	  which	  includes	  farms	  growing	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  twelve	  crops	  (barley,	  canola,	  corn,	  cotton,	  oats,	  peanut,	  potato,	  rice,	  sorghum,	  soybeans,	   sugar	   beets	   and	  wheat);	   and	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample.	   Corn	   or	  soybeans	  farms	  are	  defined	  as	  crop	  farms	  deriving	  more	  than	  50%	  of	  their	  value	  of	  crop	  production	   from	   corn	  or	   soybeans.	  Most	   (82%)	  of	   these	   corn/soybeans	   farms	  are	  located	  in	  the	  Midwest1.	  	  	  A	   descriptive	   analysis	   is	   first	   conducted	   to	  preliminarily	   investigate	   the	   correlation	  between	   use	   of	   crop	   insurance	   and	   marketing	   contracts.	   Farm	   and	   household	  characteristics	   are	   also	   compared	   by	   insurance	   status	   to	   provide	   clues	   to	  preliminarily	   detect	   whether	   there	   is	   selection	   bias	   in	   the	   crop	   insurance	  participation	   variable.	   Followed	   is	   the	   regression	   analysis	   that	   examines	   both	   the	  extensive	   margin	   (use	   marketing	   contract	   or	   not)	   and	   the	   intensive	   margin	  (proportion	   of	   production	   placed	   under	   marketing	   contracts).	   The	   endogeneity	   of	  crop	  insurance	  participation	  is	  also	  taken	  into	  consideration	  in	  this	  study.	  Intuitively,	  farmers’	  risk	  tolerance,	  which	  is	  unavailable	  in	  the	  ARMS	  data,	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  both	  crop	  insurance	  and	  contracting	  decisions:	  farmers	  with	  lower	  risk	  tolerance	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  both	  marketing	  contracts	  and	  crop	  insurance	  than	  those	  who	  are	  more	   risk-­‐tolerant	   or	   less	   risk-­‐averse.	   Ignoring	   the	   potential	   correlation	   between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This	   region	  consists	  of	   twelve	  states:	   Illinois,	   Indiana,	   Iowa,	  Kansas,	  Michigan,	  Minnesota,	  Missouri,	  Nebraska,	  North	  Dakota,	  Ohio,	  South	  Dakota,	  and	  Wisconsin.	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crop	   insurance	   participation	   and	   the	   omitted	   variable	   (risk	   tolerance/aversion)	  would	   likely	   result	   in	   a	   positive	   estimation	   bias.	   Additionally,	   contracting	   and	  insurance	   decisions	  may	   be	  made	   simultaneously;	   neglecting	   the	   simultaneity	  may	  cause	  invalid	  inferences	  and	  incorrect	  conclusions	  to	  be	  made	  (Velandia	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  To	   address	   these	   problems,	   two	   instrumental	   variables—loss-­‐risk	   and	   lagged	   loss	  ratio—	   are	   introduced	   and	   a	   two	   stage	   least	   squares	   approach	   is	   employed.	   The	  former	  (“loss-­‐risk”)	  is	  found	  to	  be	  a	  better	  instrument.	  
	  




2.1	  Agricultural	  Risks	  Risk	   and	   uncertainty	   are	   inherent	   in	   agriculture.	   Producers	   confront	   various	   risks;	  Table	  1	  below	  describes	  the	  key	  agricultural	  risks	  faced	  by	  producers.	  	  	  
Table	  1.	  Major	  Agricultural	  Risks	  
Risk	   Examples/Factors	  
Weather	  Risks	   Rainfall	  or	  temperature	  variability	  or	  extreme	  events	  
Biological	  Risks	   Pests,	  disease,	  contamination	  
Price	  Risks	   Low	  prices,	  market	  supply	  and	  demand,	  volatility	  
Labor	  and	  Health	  Risks	   Illness,	  death,	  injury	  
Policy	  and	  Political	  Risks	   Regulatory	  changes,	  political	  upheaval,	  disruption	  of	  markets,	  unrest	  Source:	  Agriculture	  Risk	  Management	  Team	  (ARMT)	  of	  The	  World	  Bank	  	  These	   risks	   greatly	   affect	   agricultural	   yield	   and	   price.	  Weather,	   diseases	   and	   labor	  and	  health	  risks	  could	  result	  in	  lower	  yield	  and	  cause	  loss	  of	  production;	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  price	  risks	  originating	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  agricultural	  supply	  and	  demand	  might	  create	  wide	   fluctuations	   in	   the	  market	  prices	  of	   agricultural	  products.	   Figure	  1	  and	  Figure	  2	  respectively	  exhibit	  the	  price	  trends	  and	  monthly	  price	  changes	  for	  the	  three	  largest	  U.S.	  field	  crops—corn,	  soybean,	  and	  wheat—over	  the	  previous	  decade.	  Prices	  for	  the	  three	  commodities	  have	  been	  volatile,	  especially	  for	  the	  period	  starting	  in	  late	  2006	  (Figure	  2),	  when	  prices	   for	  major	  field	  crops	  began	  to	  rise.	  Corn,	  soybean	  and	  wheat	   prices	   peaked	   in	   2008,	  with	   each	  more	   than	   doubling	   its	   value	   in	   late	   2005	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(corn	  at	  $5.47	  per	  bushel	  in	  June,	  soybeans	  at	  $13.30	  per	  bushel	  in	  July,	  and	  wheat	  at	  $10.50	  per	  bushel	  in	  March).	  Prices	  then	  fell	  substantially	  from	  their	  peaks,	  and	  rose	  again	   in	   late	   2010	   (Figure	   1).	   Grain	   markets	   appear	   to	   have	   entered	   a	   new	   era	  beginning	   about	   late	   2006,	   with	   higher	   price	   levels	   and	   wider	   swings	   (Irwin	   and	  Good,	  2009;	  Abbot,	  Hurt,	  and	  Tyner,	  2011).	  	  	  	  
	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  National	  Agricultural	  Statistics	  Service	  (NASS)	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  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  National	  Agricultural	  Statistics	  Service	  (NASS)	  
Figure	  2.	  Monthly	  Price	  Changes,	  Corn,	  Soybean,	  Wheat,	  2000-­‐2012	  
	  
2.2	  Risk	  Management	  Tools	  The	  presence	  of	  various	  agricultural	  risks	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  farm	  revenues	  have	  provided	   farm	   operators	   with	   a	   strong	   incentive	   to	   manage	   risks.	   A	   number	   of	  instruments	  and	  strategies	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  manage	  agricultural	  risks,	  among	  which	  forward	  pricing	  and	  crop	  insurance	  are	  commonly	  used.	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content).	  Cash	  forward	  contracts	  are	  one	  type	  of	  marketing	  contracts,	  with	  a	  specific	  price	   set	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   agreement	   and	   the	   commodity	   to	   be	   delivered	   on	   a	  designated	  future	  date.	  It	  is	  different	  from	  other	  types	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  in	  that	  the	   latter,	  often	  of	   longer	  duration,	   specify	  a	  price	  determining	  method	   instead	  of	  a	  specific	   price	   (MacDonald	  &	  Korb,	   2011).	   Crop	  marketing	   contracts	  may	   include	  1)	  forward	  sales	  of	  a	  growing	  crop	  or	  agreements	  made	  with	  processors	  to	  deliver	  crops	  with	  certain	  measurable	  qualities	  (e.g.,	  high	  oil	  corn,	  low	  linoleic	  soybeans,	  or	  organic	  apples),	  and	  2)	  marketing	  pool,	  which	  is	  common	  in	  rice	  and	  cotton	  marketing.	  In	  the	  ARMS	  survey,	  only	  agreements	  reached	  before	  crop	  harvest	  are	  counted	  as	  contracts;	  sales	  made	  from	  storage	  were	  considered	  cash	  sales	  (USDA,	  NASS).	  	  With	  marketing	  contracts,	  farmers	  are	  able	  to	  “lock	  in”	  crop	  prices	  before	  harvest	  or	  before	   the	   crop	   is	   marketable,	   so	   as	   to	   protect	   against	   the	   risk	   of	   adverse	   price	  changes	   in	   crops.	   In	   addition,	   marketing	   contracts	   can	   assure	   farmers	   of	   market	  access	   by	   providing	   market	   outlets	   for	   products.	   Lenders	   also	   prefer	   an	   assured	  market	  outlet	  in	  that	  it	  reduces	  the	  risks	  of	  farmer	  default	  on	  facility	  loans.	  Therefore,	  lenders	   often	   require	   farmers	   to	   have	   a	   contract	   before	   they	   provide	   a	   long-­‐term	  facility	  loan	  (MacDonald	  &	  Korb,	  2011).	  	  Despite	  all	  the	  benefits	  of	  a	  marketing	  contract,	  it	  does	  not	  allow	  farmers	  to	  maintain	  the	  ability	  to	  benefit	  from	  a	  higher	  market	  price;	  moreover,	  it	  creates	  new	  risks.	  One	  risk	   is	   that	   marketing	   contracts	   may	   increase	   the	   costs	   of	   a	   production	   shortfall.	  Under	   a	   marketing	   contract,	   a	   farmer	   has	   the	   obligation	   to	   deliver	   the	   committed	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quantity;	   however,	   in	   case	   of	   a	   production	   loss,	   if	   the	   commitment	   has	   to	   be	   met	  through	   the	   spot	   market	   and	   the	   market	   price	   rises	   above	   the	   contract	   price,	   a	  revenue	   loss	   would	   be	   incurred	   and	   add	   to	   the	   total	   costs	   of	   production	   shortfall.	  Another	  risk	  faced	  by	  farmers	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  default	  of	  contractors,	  which	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  a	  producer	  who	  grows	  a	  specialized	  commodity	  and	  is	  tied	  to	  a	  single	  purchaser	  (MacDonald	  &	  Korb,	  2011).	  	  Share	   of	   farms	   with	   crop	   marketing	   contracts	   has	   not	   been	   very	   high:	   during	   the	  1996-­‐2011	   period,	   typically	   10%-­‐20%	   of	   the	   farms	   that	   produced	   crops	   had	   used	  marketing	  contracts	  for	  crops,	  and	  there	  was	  upward	  trend	  over	  time	  (Figure	  3).	  The	  proportion	   of	   the	   value	   of	   crop	   production	   covered	   under	  marketing	   contracts	   has	  also	  been	  expanding,	  from	  23%	  in	  1996	  to	  31%	  in	  2011.	  Since	  the	  share	  of	  farms	  with	  crop	   marketing	   contracts	   is	   much	   smaller	   than	   the	   fraction	   of	   the	   value	   of	   crop	  production	  under	  marketing	  contracts,	  it	  follows	  that	  larger	  farms	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  crop	  marketing	  contracts.2	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  MacDonald	   and	   Korb	   (2011)	   analyzed	   the	   data	   from	   three	   datasets	   (USDA,	   Economic	   Research	  Service	  using	  U.S.	  Census	  Bureau,	  Census	  of	  Agriculture,	  1969;	  USDA’s	  Farm	  Costs	  and	  Returns	  Survey,	  1991;	   and	   USDA’s	   Agricultural	   Resource	   Management	   Survey,	   2001-­‐2008),	   and	   came	   to	   a	   broader	  conclusion	  that	  “large	  farms	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  than	  other	  farms	  to	  use	  agricultural	  contracts.”	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  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  Agricultural	  Resource	  Management	  Survey,	  1996-­‐2011	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Table	  2.	  Marketing	  Contract	  Use	  by	  Crop	  
Crop	  
Number	  Of	  Farms	  
Producing	  Each	  Crop	  
Farms	  with	  
Marketing	  Contracts	  
Value	  of	  Production	  Under	  
Marketing	  Contracts	  
Corn	   72,386	   21.20%	   20.15%	  
Soybean	   72,261	   18.15%	   17.69%	  
Wheat	   49,839	   11.81%	   12.99%	  
Fruit	   17,521	   32.84%	   52.05%	  
Vegetable	   14,095	   10.76%	   32.58%	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  Agricultural	  Resource	  Management	  Survey,	  1996-­‐2011	  Note:	  Data	  are	  pooled	  ARMS	  data	  from	  1996	  to	  2011.	  	  	  
2.2.2	  Federal	  Crop	  Insurance	  
Crop	  Insurance	  History	  and	  Program	  Basics	  The	   federal	   crop	   insurance	  program	  began	   in	  1938;	   it	   is	   currently	   administered	  by	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Agency	  (RMA),	  USDA.	  Crop	  insurance	  provides	  producers	  with	  risk	  management	  tools	  to	  address	  crop	  yield	  and/or	  revenue	  risks.	  Shields	  provided	  a	  brief	  description	  on	  the	  program	  basics	  (Shields,	  2010,	  p.	  1):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  purchasing	  a	  policy,	  a	  producer	  growing	  an	  insurable	  crop	  selects	  a	  level	  of	  coverage	  and	  pays	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  premium—or	  none	  of	  it	  in	  the	  case	  of	  catastrophic	  coverage—which	   increases	  as	   the	   level	  of	  coverage	  rises	  (averaging	  about	  60%	  of	   the	  total).	  The	  federal	   government	   pays	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   premium.	   Insurance	   policies	   are	   sold	   and	  completely	  serviced	  through	  16	  approved	  private	  insurance	  companies.	  The	  insurance	  companies’	  losses	  are	  reinsured	  by	  USDA,	  and	  their	  administrative	  and	  operating	  costs	  are	  reimbursed	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	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For	  the	  first	  40	  years	  after	  its	  authorization,	  federal	  crop	  insurance	  was	  only	  available	  for	  limited	  crops	  and	  counties.	  By	  1980,	  only	  26	  crops	  and	  about	  half	  of	  the	  counties	  across	   the	   nation	   were	   eligible	   for	   insurance	   coverage	   (Glauber,	   2013).	   A	   major	  milestone	   in	   the	  development	  of	   the	   federal	   crop	   insurance	  program	  was	   the	  1980	  Federal	  Crop	   Insurance	  Act,	  which	  expanded	   the	   insurance	  coverage	   to	  many	  more	  crops	   and	   regions,	   and	   was	   aimed	   to	   make	   crop	   insurance	   the	   primary	   form	   of	  catastrophic	   protection	   (Glauber,	   2013).	   To	   encourage	   greater	   participation,	  Congress	   passed	   the	   Crop	   Insurance	   Reform	  Act	   in	   1994	   and	   the	   Agricultural	   Risk	  Protection	  Act	  in	  2000,	  which	  further	  enhanced	  the	  crop	  insurance	  program	  (Shields,	  2010).	  In	  response,	  enrollment	  has	  grown	  sharply,	  increasing	  from	  101	  million	  acres	  in	  1990	  to	  more	  than	  282	  million	  in	  2012.	  (Figure	  4)	  	  	  
	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  Risk	  Management	  Agency,	  Summary	  of	  Business	  Reports	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The	   rise	   in	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   is	   partly	   attributed	   to	   the	   increases	   in	  premium	   subsidies,	   which	   made	   crop	   insurance	   increasingly	   affordable	   over	   time,	  thus	   boosting	   participation	   (Collins	   &	   Bulut,	   2011).	   Prior	   to	   the	   1980	   Act,	   farmers	  paid	   the	   full	  premium;	   the	  1980	  Act	  provided	  subsidies	  up	   to	  30%	  of	   the	  premium	  costs.	  Under	  the	  1994	  Crop	  Insurance	  Reform	  Act,	  producers	  were	  eligible	  to	  receive	  a	  basic	   level	  of	  coverage—catastrophic	  risk	  protection	  (CAT)—for	  free	  (except	  for	  a	  sign-­‐up	   fee	   equal	   to	   $50	   per	   crop	   per	   county).	   Additionally,	   subsidies	   were	   also	  provided	  for	  buy-­‐up	  levels.	  The	  2000	  Agricultural	  Risk	  Protection	  Act	  further	  raised	  the	   subsidy	   rates	   for	  most	   buy-­‐up	   levels,	  which	   brought	   increases	   in	   both	   enrolled	  acres	  and	  coverage	  levels3.	  The	  most	  recent	  Farm	  Bill	  in	  2008	  raised	  the	  subsidy	  rate	  for	   enterprise	   unit4,	   while	   leaving	   the	   subsidy	   levels	   for	   basic	   and	   optional	   units	  unchanged,	   which	   resulted	   in	   significant	   increase	   in	   enterprise	   units	   and	   use	   of	  higher	   coverage	   levels	   (Murphy,	   2011;	   Schnitkey,	   2011).	   Figure	   55	  exhibits	   the	  subsidy	  rates	  for	  crop	  insurance	  premium	  from	  1990	  to	  2012.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Enrollment	  in	  the	  crop	  insurance	  program	  rose	  from	  182	  million	  acres	  in	  1998	  to	  over	  265	  million	  in	  2011,	   a	   45%	   increase.	   Less	   than	   9%	  of	   insured	   acres	  were	   enrolled	   at	   coverage	   levels	   greater	   than	  70%	  in	  1998;	  by	  2011,	  over	  70%	  were	  enrolled	  at	  70%	  or	  higher.	  (Glauber,	  2013)	  4	  An	   enterprise	   unit	   covers	   all	   land	   of	   a	   single	   crop	   in	   a	   county	   for	   a	   producer,	   regardless	   of	  tenant/landlord	  structure.	  5	  Modified	   from	   Zulauf,	   Schnitkey	   and	   Barnaby,	   2013,	   which	   was	   updated	   from	   Zulauf	   and	   Orden,	  2012.	  Original	  calculation	  from	  USDA,	  RMA.	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  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  Risk	  Management	  Agency	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soybean	  producers	   in	  Nebraska	   and	   Iowa;	   by	   2003,	   it	  was	   offered	  nationwide,	   and	  was	  very	  popular	  among	  producers:	  acreage	  under	  revenue	  policies	  (113.5	  million)	  exceeded	   acreage	   covered	   by	   yield	   policies	   (90	   million)	   (Glauber,	   2013;	   Shields,	  2010).	  Of	   the	  total	  2.11	  million	  crop	   insurance	  policies	  sold	   in	  2012,	  revenue-­‐based	  policies	   account	   for	   61%	   (1.29	   million),	   with	   the	   remainder	   being	   yield-­‐based	  policies.	  (Figure	  6)	  	  	  
	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  Risk	  Management	  Agency,	  Summary	  of	  Business	  Reports	  
Figure	  6.	  Types	  of	  Crop	  Insurance	  Policies,	  1996-­‐2012	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during	  that	  period.	  Costs	  fell	  to	  3.7	  billion	  in	  FY2010,	  then	  rose	  again	  in	  FY2011	  and	  FY2012,	   following	   climbing	   crop	   prices.	   The	   crop	   insurance	   program	   is	   now	   the	  largest	  cost	  program	  in	  the	  farm	  safety	  net,	  and	  premium	  subsidy	  is	  the	  largest	  cost	  component	   in	   crop	   insurance,	   which	   alone	   totaled	   14.1	   billion	   in	   2012	   (Zulauf,	  Schnitkey,	   and	   Barnaby,	   2013).	   The	   sheer	   size	   of	   program	   costs	   has	   aroused	  increasing	  discussions	  on	  it;	  currently	  the	  program	  is	  being	  debated	  in	  Congress	  for	  the	  new	  2013	  Farm	  Bill.	  Under	  extreme	  pressure	  to	  cut	  federal	  spending,	  a	  variety	  of	  options	  have	  been	  proposed	  to	  reduce	  program	  costs;	  one	  alternative	  is	  to	  raise	  the	  share	  of	  premium	  paid	  by	  farms,	  that	  is,	  to	  lower	  subsidy	  rates	  (Zulauf,	  Schnitkey,	  and	  Barnaby,	  2013).	  	  	  
Table	  3.	  Government	  Cost	  of	  Federal	  Crop	  Insurance	  (Dollars	  in	  millions)	  	  










2003	   822	   1,874	   743	   149	   3,588	  
2004	   (305)	   2,387	   900	   143	   3,125	  
2005	   (293)	   2,070	   783	   139	   2,699	  
2006	   (32)	   2,517	   960	   125	   3,570	  
2007	   (1,068)	   3,544	   1,341	   123	   3,940	  
2008	   (1,717)	   5,301	   2,016	   137	   5,737	  
2009	   108	   5,198	   1,602	   131	   7,039	  
2010	   (2,523)	   4,680	   1,371	   143	   3,671	  
2011	   2,392	   7,376	   1,383	   144	   11,295	  
2012	   5,370	   7,149	   1,411	   141	   14,071	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  RMA	  1.	  Program	  Losses	  or	  (Gains	  if	  negative)	  =	  Loss	  claims	  paid	  in	  excess	  of	  premiums	  and	  other	  income.	  2.	  A&O	  =	  	  Administrative	  and	  operating.	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3.	  LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  
	  
3.1	  Introduction	  This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  review	  of	  previous	  literature.	  To	  explore	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	   on	   farmers’	   use	   of	   marketing	   contracts,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   refer	   to	   existing	  literature	   examining	   the	   interactions	   between	   crop	   insurance	   and	   forward	   pricing	  strategies,	  as	  well	  as	  factors	  influencing	  farmers’	  adoption	  of	  forward	  pricing	  tools.	  In	  addition,	  as	  crop	  insurance	  is	  publicly	  subsidized	  while	  forward	  pricing	  is	  a	  private-­‐market	   strategy,	   a	   review	   of	   analogous	   studies	   on	   Medicaid6	  and	   private	   health	  insurance	  will	   be	   helpful.	   This	   chapter	   is	   divided	   into	   three	   sections	  —	   1)	   Factors	  influencing	   farmers’	   use	   of	   forward	   pricing	   strategies,	   2)	   Forward	   pricing	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  crop	  insurance,	  and	  3)	  Medicaid	  and	  the	  crowding	  out	  of	  private	  health	  insurance.	  The	  “Factors	  influencing	  farmers’	  use	  of	  forward	  pricing	  strategies”	  section	  reviews	  literature	  that	  analyzes	  factors	  determining	  the	  use	  of	  forward	  pricing	  tools.	  The	   “Forward	   pricing	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   crop	   insurance”	   section	   reviews	   studies	  using	  simulation	  models	  to	  investigate	  the	  impact	  of	  different	  crop	  insurance	  designs	  on	  the	  optimal	  use	  of	  forward	  pricing	  strategies.	  The	  “Medicaid	  and	  the	  crowding	  out	  of	   private	   health	   insurance”	   section	   reviews	   literature	   about	   the	   crowding	   out	   of	  private	   health	   insurance	   arising	   from	   the	   implementation	   and/or	   expansion	   of	   the	  Medicaid	  program.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Medicaid	   is	   health	   coverage	   available	   to	   certain	   people	   and	   families	  who	   have	   limited	   income	   and	  resources.	  (http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11306.pdf)	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3.2	  Factors	  influencing	  farmers’	  use	  of	  forward	  pricing	  strategies	  Most	   research	   on	   crop	   risk	   management	   analyzes	   aggregate	   forward	   pricing	  strategies	   or	   focuses	   on	   hedging	   with	   futures/options.	   Literature	   specific	   to	   crop	  marketing	  contracts	  has	  been	  limited.	  	  
3.2.1	  Marketing/Forward	  Contracts	  Cole	  and	  Kirwan	  (2009)	  created	  a	  “pseudo-­‐panel”	  by	  linking	  seven	  years	  (1999-­‐2005)	  of	   the	   Agricultural	   Resource	  Management	   Survey	   (ARMS)	   datasets.	   This	   allows	   for	  greater	  flexibility	  in	  specification	  and	  the	  possibility	  to	  explore	  time	  variation	  and	  to	  include	  crop	  or	  region	  fixed	  effects.	  They	  found	  that	  forward	  (marketing)	  contracting	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  education,	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  age	  and	  relatively	  unrelated	   to	   experience.	   These	   findings	   suggested	   that	   cognitive	   costs	  might	   affect	  farmers’	  ability	  to	  mange	  risk.	  Paulson	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  employed	  the	  2003-­‐2005	  ARMS	  data	  to	  analyze	  the	  associations	  between	  producer	  and	  contractor	  characteristics,	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  marketing	  contracts,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  contract	  structures.	  The	  sample	  is	   restricted	   to	   corn	  and/or	   soybean	   farmers	   in	   the	   states	  of	   Illinois,	   Indiana,	   Iowa,	  Minnesota,	  Missouri,	  and	  Ohio.	  Results	  provided	  evidence	  of	  producer	  characteristics	  affecting	  contract	  decisions;	  for	  example,	  farm	  size	  and	  leverage	  positively	  impact	  the	  decision	  to	  produce	  soybeans	  under	  marketing	  contracts.	  Crop	  insurance	  was	  found	  to	  be	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  for	  corn	  and	  soybeans.	  	  Katchova	  and	  Miranda	   (2004)	  utilized	  a	   two-­‐step	  econometric	  model	   to	   investigate	  farmers’	  marketing	  contract	  decisions.	   In	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  studies	  that	  used	  Tobit,	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Poisson,	   or	   multinomial	   logit	   models,	   they	   relaxed	   the	   restrictive	   assumption	   that	  personal	   and	   farm	  characteristics	   influence	   the	   adoption	  decision	   and	   the	  quantity,	  frequency,	  and	  contract	  type	  decisions	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Therefore,	  they	  used	  a	  binary	  sub-­‐model	   to	   capture	   farmers’	   marketing	   contracts	   adoption	   decisions,	   and	  conditional	  on	  adoption,	  a	  conditional	  truncated	  sub-­‐model	  was	  employed	  to	  examine	  the	   characteristics	   affecting	   their	   decisions	   regarding	   quantity	   contracted,	  contracting	  frequency,	  and	  type	  of	  marketing	  contract.	  They	  concluded	  that	  “personal	  and	  farm	  characteristics	  mostly	  affect	  the	  adoption	  decision	  rather	  than	  the	  quantity,	  frequency,	  and	  contract	   type	  decisions.	  Moreover,	  personal	  and	  farm	  characteristics	  that	   increase	   the	   probability	   of	   adopting	   marketing	   contracts	   do	   not	   necessarily	  increase	  the	  quantity	  contracted,	  contracting	  frequency,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  both	  types	  of	  contracts”.	   Following	   Katchova	   and	   Miranda	   (2004),	   Franken	   et	   al.	   (2012)	  investigates	  the	  factors	  influencing	  Illinois	  corn	  and	  soybean	  producers’	  proportional	  use	   of	   futures	   and	   options,	   forward	   contracts,	   production	   contracts,	   and	   spot	   sales	  using	   both	   Tobit	   and	   Cragg’s	   (1971)	   hurdle	   model.	   Results	   showed	   that	   the	  proportion	   forward	   contracted	   was	   decreasing	   in	   age	   and	   increasing	   in	   acreage,	  education	  and	  risk	  aversion.	  	  	  Velandia	  et	  al.	   (2009)	   took	   into	   consideration	   the	   simultaneous	  adoption	  of	   several	  risk	  management	   tools.	   They	   argued	   that	   “it	   is	   possible	   to	   adopt	   risk	  management	  tools	  simultaneously	  and	  thus	  it	   is	   likely	  that	  these	  decisions	  are	  correlated.”	  In	  this	  consideration,	   they	  employed	  a	  multivariate	  and	  a	  multinomial	  probit	  model	   rather	  than	   separate,	   single-­‐equation	   probit	   estimation	   to	   analyze	   factors	   affecting	   the	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adoption	  of	  the	  risk	  management	  tools	  (i.e.,	  crop	  insurance,	  forward	  contracting,	  and	  spreading	  sales),	  such	  that	  the	  estimated	  marginal	  effects	  represented	  the	  effect	  of	  an	  explanatory	   variable	   on	   the	   probability	   of	   adopting	   the	   first	   risk	  management	   tool,	  conditional	  on	  the	  other	  tools	  being	  adopted.	  The	  data	  used	  in	  this	  study	  are	  from	  a	  2001	  mail	   survey	   of	   corn	   and	   soybean	   farmers	   in	   Illinois,	   Iowa,	   and	   Indiana.	   Their	  analysis	   showed	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   adopt	   forward	   contracting	   is	   positively	  influenced	   by	   the	   decision	   to	   adopt	   the	   other	   tools.	   Other	   factors	   found	   to	  significantly	  affect	  forward	  contracting	  are	  farm	  size,	  proportion	  of	  owned	  acres,	  age,	  education	  and	  off-­‐farm	  income.	  	  
3.2.2	  Aggregate	  forward	  pricing	  strategies	  and	  hedging	  with	  futures/options	  Makus,	   et	   al.	   (1990)	   used	   a	   Probit	   model	   to	   quantify	   factors	   influencing	   the	  probability	  of	  a	  selected	  group	  of	  agricultural	  decision	  makers	  hedging	  with	  futures	  or	  options	  during	  the	  1986,	  1987,	  or	  1988	  marketing	  years.	  The	  sample	  used	  in	  this	  study	   was	   a	   random	   selection	   from	   participants	   in	   the	   orientation	   session	   of	   the	  nationwide	   Futures	   and	   Option	   Marketing	   Pilot	   Program	   and	   represented	   a	   wide	  variety	   of	   producers.7	  Results	   suggested	   that	   previous	   use	   of	   a	   forward	   contract,	  possession	   of	   a	  bachelor's	   degree	   or	   above,	   membership	   in	   a	   marketing	   club,	   and	  gross	  farm	  sales	  had	  the	  greatest	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  probability	  of	  using	  futures	  and	  options.	  Based	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  42	   Indiana	   farmers,	  Shapiro	  and	  Brorsen	  (1988)	  studied	   the	   factors	  explaining	   farmers’	  use	   futures	  markets	  with	  a	  Tobit	   regression	  model.	   Four	   categories	   of	   factors	   were	   considered—farmers’	   perception	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  However,	   it	   is	   not	   necessarily	   representative	   of	   the	   general	   population	   of	   agricultural	   producers.	  (Makus	  et	  al.,	  1990)	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effectiveness	  of	  hedging	  and	  measure	  of	  risk	  aversion;	  personal	  characteristics	  such	  as	   age,	   experience,	   education	   and	  management	   ability;	   farm	   features	   like	   farm	   size	  and	   debt	   position;	   and	   adoptions	   of	   alternative	   risk-­‐reducing	   strategies.	   Results	  indicated	   that	   the	   most	   important	   factors	   are	   perception	   of	   the	   ability	   of	   futures	  markets	   to	   reduce	   risks	   and	   the	   farm’s	   debt	   position.	   Notably,	   adoption	   of	   crop	  insurance	  was	  considered	  in	  this	  study	  and	  was	  found	  to	  be	  statistically	  insignificant.	  However,	  the	  sample	  was	  nonrandom	  with	  a	  relatively	  small	  size,	  it	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  general	  population	  of	  agricultural	  producers.	  	  	  Unlike	   the	   general	   studies	   above,	   some	   other	   literature	   focused	   on	   one	   or	   more	  factors	   of	   particular	   interest.	   Turvey	   and	   Baker	   (1990)	   concerned	  more	   about	   the	  relationships	  between	  futures/options	  use	  and	  farm	  finance	  as	  well	  as	  farm	  programs.	  They	   developed	   a	   farm-­‐level	   discrete	   stochastic	   programing	   model	   (DSP)	   to	  investigate	   farmers’	   optimal	   use	   of	   futures	   and	   options	   under	   alternative	   farm	  programs	  and	  capital	  structures.	   	  One	  important	  finding	  was	  that	  farms	  with	  higher	  debt	  tended	  to	  hedge	  more,	  which	  has	  the	  rationale	  that	  hedging	  provides	  a	  potential	  source	  of	  cash	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  “safeguard	  against	  the	  risk	  of	  financial	  distress”	  (Cole	  &	  Kirwan,	   2009).	   Goodwin	   and	   Schroeder	   (1994)	   used	   a	   sample	   of	   509	   Kansas	  producers	   to	   evaluate	   factors	   affecting	   adoption	   of	   forward	   pricing	   methods.	  Producers’	  human	  capital	  accumulation	  through	  “participation	   in	  public	  and	  private	  risk	  management	  and	  marketing	  seminars”	  received	  special	  attention	  in	  their	  study.	  Results	   showed	   that	   “participation	   in	   marketing/risk	   management	   educational	  programs	  significantly	  increases	  farmers'	  adoption	  of	  forward-­‐pricing	  techniques.”	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  Several	  other	  studies	  limited	  the	  analysis	  to	  a	  certain	  farm/enterprise	  size.	  Musser	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  paid	  close	  attention	  to	  large-­‐scale	  farms.	  They	  obtained	  data	  from	  a	  survey	  of	   participants	   in	   the	   1993	   Top	   Farmers	   Workshop	   at	   Purdue	   University	   and	  examined	   the	   effects	   of	   risk	   and	   farm	   characteristics	   on	   the	   use	   of	   pre-­‐harvest	  marketing	   techniques	   for	   a	   group	   of	   large-­‐scale	  Midwestern	   grain	   farmers.	   Results	  from	   maximum-­‐likelihood	   Tobit	   estimates	   generally	   suggested	   “a	   large	   random	  component	   on	   forward	   pricing”	   and	   some	   non-­‐economic	   explanations	   may	   exist.	  However,	   due	   to	   the	   small	   sample	   size	   and	   potential	   selection	   bias,	   results	   in	   this	  study	   could	   hardly	   be	   generalized.	   Nevertheless,	   it	  might	   have	   implications	   for	   the	  marketing	   behaviors	   of	   commercial	   farmers.	   Unlike	   Musser	   et	   al.,	   Pennings	   and	  Garcia	  (2004)	  showed	  more	  interest	  in	  small	  and	  medium-­‐sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs).	  Based	  on	  a	  dataset	   of	  415	  SMEs,	  which	   contains	  both	   accounting	   and	  experimental	  data,	   they	   explored	   factors	   that	   drive	   derivative	   usage	   in	   SMEs.	   In	   particular,	   they	  emphasized	  the	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  influences	  of	  these	  factors.	  Using	  a	  generalized	  mixture	  regression	  model,	  they	  demonstrated	  that	  risk	  exposure,	  risk	  perception,	  risk	  attitude,	  and	  the	  decision-­‐making	  unit,	  which	  help	  explain	  hedging	  behavior,	  were	  not	  homogeneous	   across	   all	   managers	   and	   could	   “partially	   be	   traced	   to	   differences	   in	  attitudes,	  perceptions,	  and	  to	  differences	  in	  ownership	  structure.”	  	  	  Results	  from	  most	  of	  the	  foregoing	  literature	  cannot	  be	  safely	  generalized	  due	  to	  their	  limited	  sample	  sizes	  or	  geographic	  distributions	  or	  economic	  scales.	  Mishra	  and	  El-­‐Osta	   (2002)	   used	   a	  more	   nationally	   representative	   dataset—the	   1994	   Agricultural	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Resource	  Management	  Survey	  (ARMS)	  data8,	  and	  employed	  a	  discrete	  choice	  model	  to	   conduct	   separate	   farm-­‐level	   analyses	   for	   farmers’	   use	   of	   hedging	   and	   crop	  insurance.	  Factors	  found	  to	  be	  positively	  related	  to	  farmers’	  participation	  in	  hedging	  markets	   include	  education,	  off-­‐farm	   income,	   forward	  contracting	   sales	  of	   crops	  and	  livestock,	  and	  computer	  use.	  	  	  To	   summarize,	   factors	   commonly	   found	   to	  be	  useful	   in	  explaining	   farmers’	   forward	  pricing	   behaviors	   could	   be	   categorized	   into	   three	   groups:	   personal/	   household	  characteristics	  such	  as	  age,	  experience,	  education,	   risk	  attitude	  and	  risk	  perception;	  farm	   characteristics	   like	   farm	   size,	   gross	   farm	   revenue	   and	   leverage	   level;	   and	  alternative	  means	  of	  reducing	  risks,	  for	  example,	  off-­‐farm	  employment	  or	  investment	  and	   crop	   diversification.	   The	   adoption	   of	   crop	   insurance	   was	   included	   as	   an	  explanatory	  variable	  in	  a	  few	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Shapiro	  and	  Brorsen,	  1988;	  Goodwin	  and	  Schroeder,	   1994;	   Katchova	   and	   Miranda,	   2004;	   Paulson	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   but	   none	   of	  these	   studies	   considered	   the	   potential	   endogeneity	   of	   crop	   insurance	   participation.	  Therefore,	  the	  estimates	  regarding	  the	  influence	  of	  crop	  insurance	  may	  be	  biased.	  
	  
3.3	  Forward	  pricing	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  crop	  insurance	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	   forward	  contracting	  has	  been	  the	  principal	  private-­‐market	  risk	  management	   tool	   of	  U.S.	   crop	   farmers	   (e.g.,	   Goodwin	   and	   Schroeder,	   1994;	   Patrick,	  Musser,	   and	   Eckman,	   1998;	   Isengildina	   and	   Hudson,	   2001;	   Katchova	   and	  Miranda,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  ARMS	  is	  a	  multi-­‐frame	  stratified	  survey	  with	  the	  sample	  being	  drawn	  from	  both	  a	  list	  and	  an	  area	  frame.	  It	  is	  conducted	  annually	  by	  the	  USDA’s	  Economic	  Research	  Service	  and	  the	  National	  Agricultural	  Statistics	  Service.	  (Mishra	  &	  El-­‐Osta,	  2002)	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2004;	   Pennings	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Davis	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Mallory	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   research	   has	  focused	   on	   futures	   hedging	   as	   the	   private-­‐market	   risk	   management	   tool	   when	  investigating	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  private	  risk	  management	  strategies.	  	  Previous	   studies	   that	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	  on	   forward	  pricing	   are	  mostly	   simulation	   analyses,	   which	   specify	   expected	   utility	   maximizing	   models	   and	  calculate	   the	   optimal	   hedge	   ratio	   given	  different	   designs	   of	   crop	   insurance.	   Results	  generally	   show	   a	   complementary	   relationship	   between	   crop	   yield	   insurance	   and	  hedging,	  while	  revenue	  insurance	  and	  hedging	  are	  substitutes.	  	  Poitras	   (1993)	   studied	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   on	   hedging	   theoretically	   by	  specifying	   an	   expected	   utility	   function	   introducing	   various	   types	   of	   crop	   insurance	  into	   the	   problem.	   The	   farmer's	   objective	   is	   to	   maximize	   the	   expected	   utility	   of	  terminal	  wealth	  assuming	   that	   insurance	   is	   fairly	  priced	  and	   that	   futures	  prices	  are	  unbiased.	  The	  equation	  is	  shown	  below:	  	   𝐸𝑈 = 𝑈 𝐸 𝑊!!! −   𝑏 ∗ 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑊!!! +   𝑐 ∗ 𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑤[𝑊!!!]	  	  where	  b	  and	  c	  (both	  >0)	  measure	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  EU	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  variance	  and	  skewness	  of	  terminal	  wealth,	  respectively.	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The	  author	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  in	  general,	  the	  availability	  of	  crop	  insurance	  has	  a	   significant	   impact	  on	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  optimal	   futures	  hedging	   solutions	  and	  the	  impact	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  crop	  insurance	  provided.	  	  Later	  studies	  incorporated	  numerical	  simulations	  in	  their	  analyses.	  Coble	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  used	   a	   von	   Neumann-­‐Morgenstern	   utility	   function—which	   is	   defined	   over	   end-­‐of-­‐season	   wealth	   (W)	   and	   is	   strictly	   increasing,	   concave,	   and	   twice	   continuously	  differentiable—as	   the	   behavioral	   model	   to	   analyze	   the	   relationship	   of	   four	   crop	  insurance	   designs	   (i.e.,	   Multiple-­‐Peril	   Crop	   Insurance	   (MPCI),	   Market	   Value	  Protection	  (MVP),	  pure	  revenue	  insurance	  (RI),	  and	  Crop	  Revenue	  Coverage	  (CRC))	  to	  the	  optimal	  forward	  pricing	  hedge	  and	  put	  ratios	  for	  a	  risk-­‐averse	  corn	  producer.	  In	  their	  argument,	  regional	  heterogeneity	  is	  most	  apparent	  in	  yield	  variability	  and	  yield-­‐price	   correlation,	   therefore,	   four	   counties	   representing	   farms	   from	   areas	   with	  differing	  levels	  of	  yield	  variability	  and	  yield-­‐price	  correlation	  were	  chosen	  to	  conduct	  a	   numerical	   simulation.	   Results	   showed	   that	   insurance	   protection	   did	   not	   have	   a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  optimal	  hedge	  ratio	  until	  the	  insurance	  coverage	  increased	  to	  a	   certain	   level.	   After	   that,	   yield	   insurance	   designs	   were	   found	   to	   be	   purely	  complementary	  to	  hedging,	  while	  revenue	  insurance	  designs	  showed	  a	  more	  complex	  relationship	  with	  the	  optimal	  hedge.	  Generally,	  “revenue	  insurance	  tends	  to	  result	  in	  slightly	   lower	   hedging	   demand	   than	   would	   occur	   given	   the	   same	   level	   of	   yield	  insurance	  coverage.”	  In	  a	  later	  study	  that	  highly	  resembles	  their	  2000	  paper,	  Coble	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  extended	  the	  work	  to	  cotton	  and	  soybean	  and	  came	  to	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  that	  yield	  insurance	  compliments	  forward	  pricing	  while	  pure	  revenue	  insurance	  has	  a	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negative	   effect.	   Other	   insurance	   designs	   fall	   between	   the	   two	   extremes	   of	   yield	  insurance	  and	  pure	  revenue	  insurance.	  	  A	  similar	  relationship	  was	  examined	  by	  Mahul	  (2003)	  using	   individual-­‐level	  data	  of	  French	   wheat	   farms,	   which	   accounted	   for	   both	   the	   systematic	   component	   and	   an	  idiosyncratic	   part	   of	   individual	   risk.	   Five	   mutually	   exclusive	   fair	   agricultural	  insurance	   policies	   (individual	   and	   aggregate	   crop	   yield	   insurance,	   individual	   and	  aggregate	  crop	  revenue	  insurance,	  and	  the	  US	  Crop	  Revenue	  Coverage)	  were	  modeled.	  Consistent	  with	   earlier	   studies	   of	   Coble	   et	   al.	   (2003),	   it	   indicated	   a	   complementary	  relationship	   between	   futures	   and	   crop	   yield	   insurance,	   whereas	   futures	   and	   crop	  revenue	   insurance	   policies	   were	   substitutes.	   Furthermore,	   these	   properties	   were	  strengthened	  with	  increasing	  insurance	  guarantee	  levels.	  	  In	  a	  further	  extension	  of	  their	  previous	  work,	  Coble	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  investigated	  the	  joint	  effect	  of	  government	  crop	  insurance	  and	  loan	  programs	  on	  futures	  hedging.	  Optimal	  futures	  hedge	  ratios	  were	  derived	  for	  expected	  utility-­‐maximizing	  soybean	  producers.	  An	   important	   finding	   is	   that	   the	  model	   suggested	  a	   “crowding	  out”	  effect	  of	  private	  risk	  management	   tools.	   The	   authors	   therefore	   concluded	   that	   it	   was	   “inefficient	   to	  create	   redundant	   subsidized	   risk	   protection	   programs	   that	   strongly	   substitute	   for	  private	   risk	   management	   tools	   that	   are	   readily	   available	   from	   the	   market.”	   This	  conclusion,	   to	   some	   extent,	   implies	   the	   possibility	   for	   a	   “crowding	   out”	   effect	   of	  federal	  crop	  insurance	  on	  farmers’	  use	  of	  hedging.	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Taken	   together,	   literature	   that	   explores	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   on	   forward	  pricing	   has	   focused	   on	   hedging	   with	   futures;	   in	   addition,	   these	   studies	   have	   used	  various	   optimal	   hedging	   models.	   However,	   as	   Tomek	   and	   Peterson	   (2001)	   stated,	  “Numerous	  models	  of	  optimal	  marketing	  portfolios	   for	   farmers	  have	  been	  specified,	  but	  their	  behavior	  appears	  to	  be	  inconsistent	  with	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  of	  these	  models.”	  	  	  
3.4	  Medicaid	  and	  the	  “Crowding	  Out”	  of	  Private	  Health	  Insurance	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  crop	  insurance	  might	  crowd	  out	  farmers’	  demand	  for	  forward	  pricing.	  Despite	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  “crowding	  out”	  effect,	  little	  literature	  exists	  on	  this	   issue	  that	  empirically	  studies	  the	  actual	  responses	  of	   farmers	  to	  crop	  insurance	  when	  making	   forward	  pricing	  decisions.	  Fortunately,	  a	  good	  analogy	   is	  provided	  by	  the	   research	   investigating	   the	   influence	   of	   Medicaid	   program	   on	   the	   demand	   for	  private	  health	  insurance,	  most	  of	  which	  provided	  evidence	  on	  a	  “crowding	  out”	  effect.	  	  A	  large	  expansion	  in	  Medicaid	  eligibility	  occurred	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s.	  Various	  studies	  took	  advantage	  of	  this	  expansion	  to	  evaluate	  the	  impact	  of	  Medicaid	  program	  on	  private	  health	  insurance	  coverage.	  Considering	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  of	   individual	  Medicaid	   eligibility	   to	  private	   insurance	   coverage	  9,	   Culter	   and	  Gruber	  (1996)	   used	   the	  March	   Current	   Population	   Surveys	   (CPS)	   data	   for	   1988-­‐1993	   and	  employed	   an	   instrumental	   variable	   regression	   to	   identify	   the	   impact	   of	   Medicaid	  eligibility	   expansion	   on	   private	   health	   insurance.	   They	   created	   an	   instrument	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  According	  to	  the	  authors,	  endogeneity	  might	  be	  a	  problem	  in	  their	  study	  because	  both	  individual	  Medicaid	  eligibility	  and	  private	  insurance	  coverage	  are	  associated	  with	  income,	  which	  was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  independent	  variables	  for	  the	  regression.	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reflects	   the	   average	   state-­‐level	   eligibility	   as	   it	   varies	   only	   with	   the	   legislative	  environment	  by	  state	  and	  year.	  Their	  final	  estimates	  for	  the	  “crowding	  out”	  effect	  for	  Medicaid	   eligibility	   expansion	   was	   that	   about	   50%	   of	   the	   increase	   in	   Medicaid	  coverage	   was	   offset	   by	   a	   reduction	   in	   private	   insurance	   coverage.	   This	   result,	  however,	  was	  not	  supported	  by	  a	  later	  study	  of	  Dubay	  and	  Kenny	  (1997),	  which	  used	  the	  data	  from	  the	  same	  survey	  (CPS)	  but	  limited	  to	  two	  years	  (1989	  and	  1993).	  The	  authors	   estimated	   the	   “crowding	   out”	   effect	   with	   the	   Urban	   Institute’s	   Transfer	  Income	  Model,	  Version	  2	  (TRIM2)10	  and	  found	  only	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  “crowding	  out”	  of	   private	   insurance	   by	  Medicaid.	   About	   a	   decade	   later,	   Shore-­‐Sheppard	   (2008)	   re-­‐examined	   the	   impact	   of	   Medicaid	   eligibility	   expansion	   on	   Medicaid	   take-­‐up	   and	  private	  insurance	  “crowd-­‐out”	  by	  scrutinizing	  a	  number	  of	  critiques	  leveled	  at	  Cutler	  and	  Gruber’s	  1996	  work	  and	  extending	  the	  analysis	  to	  include	  further	  expansions	  of	  Medicaid.	  Estimates	  from	  Culter	  and	  Gruber	  (1996)	  were	  largely	  confirmed	  except	  for	  that	   accounting	   for	   age	   specific	   time	   trends	   greatly	   reduced	   the	   estimated	   take-­‐up	  and	   crowd-­‐out.	   Also,	   later	   expansions	  were	   found	   to	   generate	  much	   lower	   rates	   of	  take-­‐up	  and	  crowding	  out.	  	  Blumberg,	   Dubay	   and	   Norton	   (2000)	   and	   Yazici	   &	   Kaestner	   (2000)	   both	   used	   a	  difference-­‐in-­‐differences	   approach	   to	   examine	   the	   magnitude	   of	   “crowding	   out”	   of	  private	   insurance	   coverage	   from	   Medicaid	   eligibility	   expansion	   for	   children.	   They	  compared	   the	   changes	   in	   insurance	   coverage	   of	   children	   affected	   by	   the	   eligibility	  expansion	  to	  changes	  for	  children	  who	  were	  unaffected.	  The	  main	  difference	  between	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  A	  micro	   simulation	  model	   of	   tax	   and	   transfer	   programs	   affecting	   individuals	   and	   families.	   (Dubay	  and	  Kenny,	  1997)	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these	  two	  studies,	  besides	  the	  use	  of	  different	  data,	  is	  that	  they	  use	  different	  control	  groups.	  The	  former	  used	  older	  children	  from	  poor	  and	  near-­‐poor	  families	  as	  a	  control	  group	   for	   younger	   children	   from	   poor	   and	   near-­‐poor	   families;	  while	   for	   the	   latter,	  children	   of	   the	   same	   age,	   but	   from	   families	   with	   higher	   incomes	   were	   used.	   Both	  studies	   found	  a	  “crowding	  out”	  effect	  among	  children,	  but	   the	  estimated	  extent	  was	  different.	  	  Rather	  than	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  Medicaid	  eligibility	  expansion	  for	  a	  specific	  group	  of	  people,	   several	   other	   studies	   evaluated	   the	   potential	   changes	   in	   the	   demand	   for	  private	  health	  insurance	  in	  response	  to	  different	  Medicaid	  eligibility	  levels.	  Rask	  and	  Rask	   (2000)	   conducted	   a	   cross-­‐sectional	   analysis	   by	   modeling	   the	   probability	   of	  choosing	   each	   of	   the	   three	   insurance	   alternatives	   (private	   insurance,	   Medicaid	   or	  uninsured)	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	   availability	   of	   uncompensated	   care	   reimbursement	  funds,	  Medicaid	  programs,	   and	  demographic	   characteristics	   for	   four	   income	  groups	  (below	   poverty,	   low	   income,	   middle	   income,	   high	   income).	   Identification	   of	   the	  impact	  was	  derived	   from	  state	  differences	   in	  Medicaid	  eligibility	   standards.	  Results	  suggested	  that	  less	  restrictive	  Medicaid	  eligibility	  standards	  were	  associated	  with	  less	  private	  insurance	  coverage	  in	  all	  income	  groups.	  Brown,	  Coe	  and	  Finkelstein	  (2007)	  examined	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  level	  of	  assets	  an	  individual	  can	  keep	  while	  qualifying	  for	  Medicaid,	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	  private	  long-­‐term	  care	  insurance.	  Their	  central	  estimate	  indicated	   a	   1.1	   percentage	   point	   increase	   in	   private	   long-­‐term	   care	   insurance	  coverage	   resulting	   from	   a	   $10,000	   decrease	   in	   the	   level	   of	   assets	   protected	   under	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Medicaid,	   which	   provided	   evidence	   of	   Medicaid	   crowd-­‐out	   of	   demand	   for	   private	  long-­‐term	  care	  insurance.	  	  Although	  the	  literature	  cited	  in	  this	  part	  is	  not	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  research	  topic	  in	  the	   present	   study,	   it	   does	   provide	   valuable	   reference	   on	   research	   methods.	   The	  conclusions	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   Medicaid	   and	   private	   health	  insurance	   might	   also	   have	   some	   implications	   for	   crop	   insurance	   and	   marketing	  contracts.	  	  
3.5	  Summary	  This	   section	   reviewed	   literature	   associated	   with	   determinants	   of	   farmers’	   forward	  pricing	  decisions	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  forward	  pricing	  (research	  has	  mainly	  focused	   on	   hedging)	   and	   crop	   insurance.	   Specifically,	   studies	   from	   three	   different	  aspects	  are	  cited.	  	  	  The	   first	   part	   reviewed	   literature	   that	   investigated	   factors	   influencing	   farmers’	  forward	  pricing	  (i.e.,	  forward/marketing	  contracts	  and	  hedging)	  decisions.	  Most	  work	  has	   studied	   farmers’	   forward	   pricing	   decisions	   in	   isolation	   from	   other	   risk	  management	  tools.	  A	  few	  studies	  have	  considered	  the	  combination	  of	  crop	  insurance	  and	   forward	   pricing	   in	   their	   analyses	   (e.g.,	   Shapiro	   &	   Brorsen,	   1988;	   Goodwin	   &	  Schroeder,	  1994;	  Katchova	  &	  Miranda,	  2004;	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Generally,	  three	  categories	  of	   factors	   were	   found	   to	   have	   impacts	   on	   farmers’	   forward	   pricing	   decisions—	  personal	   characteristics	   (e.g.,	   age,	   experience,	   education,	   risk	   attitude	   and	   risk	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perception),	   farm	   characteristics	   (e.g.,	   farm	   size,	   gross	   farm	   revenue	   and	   leverage	  level),	  and	  alternative	  means	  of	  reducing	  risks	  (e.g.,	  off-­‐farm	  income).	  The	  adoption	  of	  crop	   insurance	   was	   considered	   as	   an	   explanatory	   variable	   in	   a	   few	   studies	   (e.g.,	  Shapiro	   and	   Brorsen,	   1988;	   Goodwin	   and	   Schroeder,	   1994;	   Katchova	   and	  Miranda,	  2004;	  Paulson	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  However,	  none	  of	  these	  studies	  considered	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	   of	   crop	   insurance	   participation,	   possibly	   result	   in	   biased	   estimates	   of	  crop	  insurance	  influence.	  	  The	   second	   part	   reviewed	   research	   related	   to	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   on	  forward	  pricing.	  Research	  has	  focused	  on	  hedging	  with	  futures	  as	  the	  forward	  pricing	  tool.	  All	  the	  work	  cited	  used	  a	  utility-­‐maximizing	  model	  to	  analyze	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  the	  optimal	  hedge	  ratios,	  which	  assumed	  that	  farmers	  behave	  optimally.	  Overall,	   results	   suggested	   that	   a	   revenue-­‐based	   policy	   substitutes	   for	   hedging,	  whereas	  a	  yield-­‐based	  policy	  and	  hedging	  are	  complementary	  to	  each	  other.	  	  The	   last	   part	   reviewed	   studies	   on	   the	   “crowding	   out”	   effect	   of	  Medicaid	   on	   private	  health	   insurance.	   It	   was	   generally	   agreed	   that	   “crowding	   out”	   did	   exist,	   however,	  different	  conclusions	  have	  been	  reached	  regarding	  its	  extent.	  	  Literature	  in	  this	  part	  is	  useful	   to	   refer	   to,	   as	   the	   relationship	   between	   Medicaid	   and	   private	   insurance	   is	  analogous	   to	   that	   of	   crop	   insurance	   (which	   is	   a	   public	   program)	   and	   marketing	  contracts	   (which	   is	  a	  private	  risk	  management	   tool).	  The	  research	  methods	  used	   in	  the	  “Medicaid”	  literature	  also	  provide	  valuable	  reference	  for	  the	  study	  in	  this	  thesis.	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4.	  DATA	  
	  This	  section	  provides	  information	  regards	  the	  data	  sources,	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  data	  and	  how	  the	  data	  are	  utilized	  in	  this	  study.	  	  	  
4.1	  The	  Agricultural	  Resource	  Management	  Survey	  (ARMS)	  Data	  	  The	  main	  data	  used	  in	  this	  study	  comes	  from	  the	  Agricultural	  Resource	  Management	  Survey	   (ARMS).	   The	   ARMS	   is	   an	   annual	   survey	   sponsored	   jointly	   by	   the	   National	  Agricultural	   Statistics	   Service	   (NASS)	   and	   the	   Economic	   Research	   Service	   (ERS)	   of	  USDA.	  It	  is	  the	  only	  nationally	  representative	  survey	  that	  provides	  information	  on	  the	  production	   practices	   and	   financial	   condition	   of	   the	   farm	   business,	   and	   the	  characteristics	   of	   farm	   operators	   and	   their	   households.	   ARMS	   collects	   data	   from	   a	  stratified	   random	   sample	   of	  U.S.	   farms.	   Each	   observation	  has	   a	   different	  weight,	   or	  expansion	  factor,	  that	  reflects	  its	  probability	  of	  selection	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  number	  of	  farms	  it	  represents	  in	  the	  target	  population	  (Katchova	  and	  Miranda,	  2004).	  Sample	  weights	   (expansion	   factors)	   could	   be	   utilized	   to	   construct	   population	   estimates	   by	  weighting	   each	   sample	   with	   the	   appropriate	   expansion	   factor	   (USDA,	   Economic	  Research	  Service).	  	  ARMS	  consists	  of	  three	  phases;	  detailed	  contracting	  information	  is	  drawn	  from	  Phase	  III,	   Cost	   and	  Returns	  Report	   (CRR)	   survey,	  which	   is	   conducted	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   the	  year	  following	  the	  reference	  year	  (USDA,	  ERS).	  Every	  year,	  producers	  report	  the	  crop	  marketed	  with	   each	  marketing	   contract,	   the	  quantity	  under	   each	   contract,	   the	   final	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price	   received	   for	   each	   contract,	   and	   the	   total	   dollar	   amount	   received	   from	   each	  contract.	   Information	  on	   federal	  crop	   insurance	   for	  each	   farm	  is	  also	  available	   from	  the	   survey,	   but	   only	   for	   limited	   years.	   	   For	   the	   survey	   from	  2005	   to	   2011,	   farmers	  were	   asked	   for	   the	   acres	   covered	   under	   a	   federal	   crop	   insurance	   policy	   and	   the	  expense	  for	  federal	  crop	  insurance.	  	  The	   ARMS	   data	   are	   not	   longitudinal;	   to	   allow	   for	   the	   examination	   of	   variations	   in	  farmers’	   behavior	   over	   time,	   I	   follow	  Cole	   and	  Kirwan’s	   (2009)	   approach	   and	   pool	  seven	   cross-­‐sectional	   datasets	   from	   2005	   to	   2011	   to	   create	   a	   pseudo-­‐panel,	   which	  contains	  148,136	   farms.	  Total	  production	   information	   is	   available	   for	   twelve	   crops:	  barley,	  canola,	  corn,	  cotton,	  oats,	  peanut,	  potato,	  rice,	  sorghum,	  soybean,	  sugar	  beets	  and	  wheat.	   I	   keep	   only	   farms	   growing	   at	   least	   one	   of	   these	   crops.	   The	   analysis	   of	  marketing	  contracts	  decisions	  is	  conducted	  for	  two	  different	  samples—the	  “all	  farms”	  sample,	  which	  includes	  all	  farms	  growing	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  above	  twelve	  crops;	  and	  the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample,	   which	   keeps	   only	   the	   farms	   on	   which	   corn	   or	  soybeans	  is	  the	  primary	  crop	  produced.	  A	  crop	  is	  considered	  as	  the	  primary	  crop	  on	  a	  farm	  if	  its	  value	  of	  production	  takes	  up	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  total	  crop	  revenue.	  The	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample	  consists	  of	  33,237	  farms,	  most	  of	  which	  are	  located	  in	  the	  Midwest11.	  Figure	  7	  and	  Figure	  8	  below	  exhibit	  the	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  the	  farms	   in	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample.	   It	   is	   shown	   that	   82%	   of	   the	  corn/soybeans	   farms	   are	   in	   the	  Midwestern	   area,	   with	   Illinois	   (13%),	   Iowa	   (13%)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  This	  region	  consists	  of	  twelve	  states:	  Illinois,	  Indiana,	  Iowa,	  Kansas,	  Michigan,	  Minnesota,	  Missouri,	  Nebraska,	  North	  Dakota,	  Ohio,	  South	  Dakota,	  and	  Wisconsin.	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and	  Indiana	  (11%)	  taking	  the	  largest	  fractions.	  The	  top	  five	  states	  account	  for	  56%	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  farms	  in	  the	  sample.	  	  
	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  ARMS	  2005-­‐2011	  Note:	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	   as	   crop	   farms,	   and	   with	   corn	   or	  soybeans	  as	  the	  primary	  crop.	  	  
Figure	   7.	   Percentage	   of	   Corn/Soybeans	   Farms	   in	   Midwestern	   and	   Non-­‐




	  	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  ARMS	  2005-­‐2011	  Note:	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	   as	   crop	   farms,	   and	   with	   corn	   or	  soybeans	  as	  the	  primary	  crop.	  	  













Table	  4.	  Use	  of	  Crop	  Revenue	  Insurance	  in	  the	  Midwest,	  2005-­‐2011	  
Year	   Policies	  Sold	   Net	  Acres	   Liabilities	  
2005	   54.12%	   70.23%	   73.31%	  
2006	   57.71%	   75.65%	   80.98%	  
2007	   59.88%	   75.93%	   84.10%	  
2008	   62.39%	   76.97%	   83.57%	  
2009	   61.02%	   74.48%	   81.38%	  
2010	   64.09%	   79.38%	   84.75%	  
2011	   67.17%	   83.51%	   88.88%	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  RMA,	  Summary	  of	  Business.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  From	  the	  crop	  perspective,	  revenue	  insurance	  is	  also	  the	  dominant	  insurance	  policy	  for	   corn	   and	   soybeans.	   Table	   5	   and	   Table	   6	   present	   the	   share	   of	   crop	   revenue	  insurance	  usage	   in	   terms	  of	   total	  policies	  sold,	  net	  acres	  and	   liabilities	   for	  corn	  and	  soybeans	   from	  2005	   to	  2011.	   In	  2005,	   revenue-­‐based	   insurance	  accounts	   for	  about	  60%	  of	  total	  policies	  sold,	  70%	  of	  net	  acres	  insured	  and	  80%	  of	  the	  entire	  liabilities	  for	  both	  corn	  and	  soybeans;	  and	  the	  shares	  have	  been	  increasing	  over	  time.	  By	  2011,	  roughly	  80%	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  policies	  sold,	  85%	  of	  net	  acres	  insured	  and	  90%	  of	  the	  aggregate	  liabilities	  were	  revenue-­‐based	  products.	  	  
Table	  5.	  Revenue-­‐Based	  Insurance	  Use	  for	  Corn,	  2005-­‐2011	  	  
Year	   Policies	  Sold	   Net	  Acres	   Liabilities	  
2005	   62.50%	   72.53%	   79.02%	  
2006	   66.98%	   78.53%	   87.98%	  
2007	   69.56%	   79.91%	   88.12%	  
2008	   69.48%	   78.09%	   85.08%	  
2009	   72.46%	   82.68%	   87.71%	  
2010	   74.38%	   84.30%	   89.12%	  
2011	   77.11%	   86.70%	   91.17%	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  RMA,	  Summary	  of	  Business.	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Table	  6.	  Revenue-­‐Based	  Insurance	  Use	  for	  Soybeans,	  2005-­‐2011	  
Year	   Policies	  Sold	   Net	  Acres	   Liabilities	  
2005	   62.62%	   70.92%	   78.70%	  
2006	   66.12%	   74.52%	   83.34%	  
2007	   68.24%	   74.63%	   84.21%	  
2008	   69.58%	   74.41%	   83.38%	  
2009	   72.23%	   77.94%	   82.68%	  
2010	   75.45%	   83.01%	   88.54%	  
2011	   78.25%	   84.95%	   89.90%	  Data	  source:	  USDA,	  RMA,	  Summary	  of	  Business.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Despite	  its	  national	  representativeness	  and	  comprehensiveness,	  the	  ARMS	  data	  have	  several	  limitations.	  First,	  the	  survey	  does	  not	  collect	  data	  on	  the	  same	  farms	  over	  time.	  Second,	   questions	   asked	   are	   not	   completely	   consistent	   for	   each	   year.	   Finally,	   the	  ARMS	  data	  do	  not	  contain	  details	  about	  farmers’	  use	  of	  crop	  insurance:	   information	  such	  as	  the	  types	  of	  insurance	  or	  crops	  covered	  under	  insurance	  is	  not	  available.	  	  The	  first	   two	   limitations	   suggest	   that	   the	   pooled	   dataset	   is	   not	   a	   panel,	   therefore,	  unobserved	  characteristics	   inherent	   to	   the	   individual	   cannot	  be	  captured.	   Instead,	   I	  employ	  a	  state-­‐level	  fixed-­‐effects12.	  To	  overcome	  the	  last	  limitation,	  I	  conduct	  a	  farm-­‐level	  analysis	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  crop	  level.	  Analyses	  using	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample	  are	  included	  so	  that	  revenue	  insurance	  is	  the	  prevailing	  insurance	  policy	  used	  by	  the	  producers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	   ARMS	   sampling	   design	   makes	   it	   inappropriate	   to	   use	   county-­‐level	   fixed-­‐effects;	   this	   will	   be	  explained	  later.	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5.	  DESCRIPTIVE	  ANALYSIS	  
	  
5.1	  Introduction	  Using	   the	  data	   in	  Chapter	  4,	   this	   section	  presents	   a	  descriptive	  analysis	  of	   farmers’	  use	   of	   marketing	   contracts.	   A	   summary	   of	   farmers’	   use	   of	   crop	   insurance	   and	  marketing	  contracts	   is	   first	  provided.	  A	  preliminary	  examination	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	   farmers’	  use	  of	  marketing	   contracts	   and	   crop	   insurance	   is	   then	   conducted	  using	  summary	  statistics.	  Both	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  marketing	  contracts	  (the	  intensive	  margin)	  and	  the	  quantity	  placed	  under	  marketing	  contracts	  (the	  extensive	  margin)	  on	  each	  farm	  are	  examined.	  Other	  farm	  and	  personal/household	  characteristics	  are	  also	  analyzed	  for	  farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	  and	  farms	  with	  no	  marketing	  contracts,	  respectively.	   In	   addition,	   these	   farm	   and	   personal/household	   characteristics	   are	  compared	  for	  insured	  and	  uninsured	  farms	  to	  test	  whether	  farms	  with	  crop	  insurance	  are	  systematically	  different	  from	  those	  that	  are	  uninsured.	  	  
5.2	  Summary	  of	  Marketing	  Contracts	  and	  Crop	  Insurance	  Use	  Table	  7	  and	  Table	  8	  present	  the	  summary	  statistics	  for	  farmers’	  use	  of	  crop	  insurance	  and	  marketing	  contracts	  by	  year.	  During	  the	  2005-­‐2011	  period,	  the	  adoption	  rates	  of	  both	   strategies	   fluctuated	   over	   year,	   but	   in	   general,	   the	   trend	   was	   increasing.	   By	  comparison,	   crop	   insurance	  was	  much	  more	  widely	  used	   than	  marketing	   contracts.	  Conditional	   on	   having	   at	   least	   one	   marketing	   contract,	   the	   share	   of	   production	  contracted	  was	   around	  60%	   for	   the	   “all	   farms”	   sample,	   and	  50%	   for	   corn/soybean	  farms.	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Fraction	  of	  Production	  Contracted13	  
	   	   	   Unweighted	   Weighted	  by	  Production	  
2005	   0.6462	   0.2821	   0.6344	   0.5696	  
2006	   0.6527	   0.3416	   0.6500	   0.6010	  
2007	   0.7879	   0.3767	   0.6727	   0.6084	  
2008	   0.7549	   0.4620	   0.5834	   0.5780	  
2009	   0.7323	   0.3555	   0.5555	   0.6136	  
2010	   0.6852	   0.3886	   0.5769	   0.5924	  
2011	   0.7337	   0.4389	   0.5970	   0.6052	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms.	  	  	  







Fraction	  of	  Production	  Contracted	  
	   	   	   Unweighted	   Weighted	  by	  Production	  
2005	   0.6202	   0.2683	   0.4876	   0.4444	  
2006	   0.6228	   0.3146	   0.5112	   0.4993	  
2007	   0.7793	   0.3396	   0.5329	   0.5016	  
2008	   0.7565	   0.4715	   0.5096	   0.5157	  
2009	   0.7209	   0.3600	   0.4807	   0.5062	  
2010	   0.6840	   0.3803	   0.5155	   0.5178	  
2011	   0.7337	   0.4273	   0.5090	   0.5261	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms,	  and	  with	  corn	  or	  soybean	  as	  the	  primary	  crop.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  In	  both	  Table	  7	  and	  Table	  8,	  the	  fraction	  of	  production	  contracted	  is	  conditional	  on	  having	  at	  least	  one	  marketing	  contract.	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5.3	  Crop	  Insurance	  and	  the	  Adoption	  of	  Marketing	  Contracts	  	  Farmers’	   decision	   on	   whether	   to	   adopt	   marketing	   contracts	   is	   examined	   in	   this	  section.	   Table	   9	   and	   Table	   10	   describe	   how	   farms	   manage	   risks	   with	   marketing	  contracts	  and	  crop	   insurance	   for	   the	   “all	   farms”	   sample	  and	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	  sample,	   respectively.	   In	  both	   tables,	  panel	   (A)	  gives	   the	  number	  and	  share	  of	   farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	  by	  crop	  insurance	  status	  (i.e.,	  insured	  or	  uninsured).	  For	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farm”	  sample	  (“all-­‐farms”	  sample),	  among	  the	  23,317	  (43,409)	  farms	  that	   are	   insured,	   10,112	   (18,964)	   or	   about	   43%	   (44%)	   of	   them	   use	   marketing	  contracts;	  whereas	  for	  farms	  that	  have	  no	  crop	  insurance,	  the	  number	  of	  farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	   is	  2,046	  (4,040),	  which	  accounts	   for	  roughly	  21%	  (23%)	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	   farms	  uninsured.	  Panel	  (B)	  displays	  the	  number	  and	  share	  of	   farms	  with	   crop	   insurance	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	   marketing	   contracts	   (i.e.,	   use	   marketing	  contracts	   or	   no	   marketing	   contracts).	   For	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farm”	   sample	   (“all-­‐farms”	  sample),	  83%	  (82%)	  of	  the	  farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	  are	  insured,	  while	  only	  63%	  (64%)	  of	   the	   farms	  with	  no	  marketing	   contracts	  use	   crop	   insurance.	  The	  share	  of	   farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	   is	  much	  higher	  for	   insured	  farms	  than	  that	  for	  uninsured	  farms,	  and	  farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	  have	  a	  higher	  participation	  rate	  in	  crop	  insurance	  than	  that	  of	  farms	  with	  no	  marketing	  contracts.	  Inference	  can	  be	   drawn	   from	   these	   statistics	   that	   the	   adoption	   of	   marketing	   contracts	   and	   crop	  insurance	  might	  be	  positively	  correlated.	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Table	  9.	  Crop	  Insurance	  and	  Marketing	  Contract	  Use,	  All	  Farms	  
	   Farms	  Insured	   Farms	  Uninsured	   Total	  
	   Number	   Share	  (%)	   Number	   Share	  (%)	   	  
(A)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Number	  and	  Share	  of	  Farms	  Using	  Marketing	  Contracts	  by	  Insurance	  Status-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Farms	  with	  Marketing	  Contracts	   18,022	   43.74	   3,812	   22.90	   21,834	  
Farms	  with	  no	  Marketing	  Contracts	   23,180	   56.26	   12,835	   77.10	   36,015	  
Total	   41,202	   100	   16,647	   100	   57,849	  
(B)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Number	  and	  Share	  of	  Farms	  with	  Crop	  Insurance	  by	  Adoption	  of	  Marketing	  Contracts-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Farms	  with	  Marketing	  Contracts	   18,022	   82.54	   3,812	   17.46	   21,834	  
Farms	  with	  no	  Marketing	  Contracts	   23,180	   64.36	   12,835	   35.64	   36,015	  
Total	   41,202	   	   16,647	   	   57,849	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms.	  	  	  
Table	  10.	  Crop	  Insurance	  and	  Marketing	  Contract	  Use,	  Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   Farms	  Insured	   Farms	  Uninsured	   Total	  
	   Number	   Share	  (%)	   Number	   Share	  (%)	   	  
(A)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Number	  and	  Share	  of	  Farms	  Using	  Marketing	  Contracts	  by	  Insurance	  Status-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Farms	  with	  Marketing	  Contracts	   10,112	   43.37	   2,046	   20.63	   12,158	  
Farms	  with	  no	  Marketing	  Contracts	   13,205	   56.63	   7,874	   79.38	   21,079	  
Total	   23,317	   100	   9,920	   100	   33,237	  
(B)	   -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐Number	  and	  Share	  of	  Farms	  with	  Crop	  Insurance	  by	  Adoption	  of	  Marketing	  Contracts-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐	  
Farms	  with	  Marketing	  Contracts	   10,112	   83.17	   2,046	   16.83	   12,158	  
Farms	  with	  no	  Marketing	  Contracts	   13,205	   62.65	   7,874	   37.35	   21,079	  
Total	   23,317	   	   9,920	   	   33,237	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms,	  and	  with	  corn	  or	  soybean	  as	  the	  primary	  crop.	  
	  
	  
5.4	  Crop	  Insurance	  and	  Quantity	  Placed	  Under	  Marketing	  Contracts	  	  Conditional	   on	   adopting	   a	   marketing	   contract,	   the	   proportion	   of	   production	   that	  farmers	  choose	  to	  place	  under	  marketing	  contracts	  is	  examined	  in	  this	  section.	  Table	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11	  and	  Table	  12	  show	  the	  average	  proportion	  of	  production	  placed	  under	  marketing	  contracts14	  for	   insured	   and	  uninsured	   farms.	   For	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	   sample	   (Table	  11),	  the	   average	   proportion	   of	   production	   under	   marketing	   contracts	   is	   59.38%	   for	  insured	  farms;	  for	  farms	  uninsured,	  this	  proportion	  is	  higher	  (67.24%).	  A	  t-­‐test	  is	  also	  conducted	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  average	  proportion	  under	  marketing	  contracts	   between	   insured	   and	   uninsured	   farms	   is	   statistically	   significant.	   The	   t-­‐statistic	   equals	   5.29,	   which	   reject	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   there	   is	   no	   systematic	  difference.	  This	  result	  suggests	  a	  negative	  correlation	  between	  quantity	  placed	  under	  marketing	   contracts	   and	   participation	   in	   crop	   insurance.	   For	   the	   “corn/soybeans	  farms”	   (Table	   12),	   the	   average	   share	   of	   production	   contracted	   for	   insured	   and	  uninsured	   farms	   is	   50.26%	   and	   53.01%,	   respectively.	   Unlike	   for	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	  sample,	   the	   t-­‐test	   using	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample	   gives	   a	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   1.37,	  which	   fails	   to	   reject	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   and	   suggests	   a	   low	   correlation	   between	  quantity	  contracted	  and	  crop	  insurance	  adoption.	  	  






(H0:	  difference	  =	  0)	  Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	   	  
Quantity	  under	  Marketing	  Contracts	   0.5938	   0.6860	   0.6724	   0.0213	   5.29	  
Observations	   17,802	   3,740	   	  Note:	  Data	  from	  pooled	  ARMS	  data,	  2005-­‐2011.	  Sample	  includes	  farms	  having	  at	  least	  one	  marketing	  contract.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Calculated	  only	  for	  farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts.	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Table	   12.	   Production	   Under	   Marketing	   Contracts	   by	   Insurance	   Status,	  






(H0:	  difference	  =	  0)	  Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	   	  
Quantity	  under	  Marketing	  Contracts	   0.5026	   0.7536	   0.5301	   1.0429	   1.37	  
Observations	   9,644	   1,944	   	  Note:	  Data	   from	  pooled	  ARMS	  data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   farms	  with	   corn	  or	   soybean	   as	   the	  dominant	  crop	  and	  having	  at	  least	  one	  marketing	  contract.	  	  
	  
5.5	  Crop	  Insurance	  and	  Other	  Farm	  and	  Household	  Characteristics	  To	   assess	   whether	   farms	   insured	   are	   systematically	   different	   from	   those	   that	   are	  uninsured,	   the	   characteristics	   of	   farm	   and	   operator	   household	   are	   summarized	  separately	  for	  insured	  and	  uninsured	  farms.	  	  Table	   13	   and	   Table	   14	   provide	   the	   summary	   statistics	   of	   farm	   and	  personal/household	   characteristics	   by	   insurance	   status	   for	   both	   samples.	   In	   each	  table,	   the	   first	   pair	   of	   columns	   gives	   the	   mean	   and	   standard	   deviation	   of	   each	  characteristic	   for	   farms	  with	   crop	   insurance.	   The	   second	   pair	   of	   columns	   gives	   the	  same	   information	  on	   farms	  with	  no	  crop	   insurance.	  The	  summary	  statistics	  suggest	  that	   farms	   with	   crop	   insurance	   are	   systematically	   different	   from	   uninsured	   farms	  based	  on	  most	  of	  the	  observable	  characteristics.	  On	  average,	  insured	  farms	  are	  larger	  farms	   with	   higher	   farm	   revenues,	   which	   are	   also	   more	   leveraged.	   In	   addition,	   the	  operators	  of	   insured	   farms	  are	   slightly	   younger	   and	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  have	  higher	  education	   levels.	  These	  comparisons	  based	  on	  observables	   suggest	   that	   the	   insured	  and	  uninsured	  farms	  might	  be	  different	  based	  on	  un-­‐observables	  as	  well,	  that	  is,	  crop	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insurance	   participation	   might	   be	   correlated	   with	   the	   error	   term	   and	   thus	   be	  endogenous.	  
	  
Table	  13.	  Characteristics	  of	  Farms	  by	  Insurance	  Status,	  All	  Farms	  
	   Farms	  insured	   Farms	  	  Uninsured	  
	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	  
Farm	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Acres	  Operated	   1,132.49	   2,060.41	   474.53	   3,489.72	  Acres	  Owned	   484.55	   1,258.51	   275.17	   1,896.37	  Gross	  Cash	  Farm	  Income	   363,669	   698,181	   157,793	   720,055	  Net	  Farm	  Income	   104,971	   351,284	   41,641	   284,969	  Share	  of	  total	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production	   0.86	   0.53	   0.86	   0.61	  Number	  of	  Commodities	  Produced	   2.72	   1.26	   2.47	   1.25	  Entropy	   0.25	   0.13	   0.23	   0.14	  Primary	  crop	  revenue	  share	   0.69	   0.20	   0.76	   0.21	  Debt	  dummy1	   0.77	   0.42	   0.56	   0.50	  Debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  ratio	   0.16	   3.22	   0.09	   0.25	  
Personal	  and	  Household	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Age	   55	   13.07	   57	   13.72	  Experience	   30	   14.58	   29	   15.95	  Education	   	   	   	   	  Less	  than	  high	  school	   0.05	   0.22	   0.12	   0.32	  High	  school	  and	  some	  college	   0.71	   0.46	   0.70	   0.46	  College	  and	  beyond	   0.24	   0.43	   0.19	   0.39	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  to	  Total	  household	  income	  ratio	   0.58	   2.04	   0.70	   1.84	  Non-­‐farm	  Asset	   270,546	   390,418	   261,498	   427,655	  
Observations	   41,202	   16,647	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms.	  
	  
	  
Table	  14.	  Characteristics	  of	  Farms	  by	  Insurance	  Status,	  Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   Farms	  insured	   Farms	  	  Uninsured	  
	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	  
Farm	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Acres	  Operated	   818.84	   1,222.01	   331.61	   813.53	  Acres	  Owned	   333.92	   732.35	   206.00	   602.61	  Gross	  Cash	  Farm	  Income	   397,086	   734,258	   148,259	   1,540,648	  Net	  Farm	  Income	   106,199	   329,583	   38,447	   224,131	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Table	  14	  (cont.)	  Share	  of	  total	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production	   0.89	   0.53	   0.86	   0.59	  Number	  of	  Commodities	  Produced	   2.60	   1.13	   2.34	   1.19	  Entropy	   0.24	   0.12	   0.21	   0.14	  Primary	  crop	  revenue	  share	   0.70	   0.17	   0.79	   0.19	  Debt	  dummy1	   0.76	   0.43	   0.54	   0.50	  Debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  ratio	   0.17	   3.21	   0.08	   0.22	  
Personal	  and	  Household	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Age	   55	   13.07	   57	   13.70	  Experience	   30	   14.69	   29	   16.15	  Education	   	   	   	   	  Less	  than	  high	  school	   0.05	   0.22	   0.11	   0.32	  High	  school	  and	  some	  college	   0.72	   0.45	   0.72	   0.45	  College	  and	  beyond	   0.23	   0.42	   0.16	   0.37	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  to	  Total	  household	  income	  ratio	   0.60	   0.44	   0.78	   0.39	  Non-­‐farm	  Asset	   318,157	   446,199	   307,798	   491,189	  
Observations	   23,317	   9,920	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms,	  and	  with	  corn	  or	  soybean	  as	  the	  primary	  crop.	  	  	  
5.6	  Adoption	  of	  Marketing	  Contracts	  and	  Farm	  and	  Household	  Characteristics	  This	   section	  provides	   the	   summary	   statistics	   of	   farm	  and	  household	   characteristics	  separately	  for	  farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	  and	  those	  without	  marketing	  contracts.	  The	  information	  provided	  in	  the	  tables	  below	  helps	  discover	  factors	  other	  than	  crop	  insurance	  that	  might	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  farmers’	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts.	  	  For	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample,	   the	   average	   farm15	  operated	   approximately	  633	  acres	  with	  gross	   farm	  revenues	  of	  $301,972.	  On	  average,	   farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	   have	   74%	  more	   acres	   than	   farms	  with	   no	  marketing	   contracts;	   the	   gross	  cash	   farm	   income	   for	   the	   former	   is	  more	   than	  double	   that	   for	   the	   latter	   (Table	  15).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Weighted	  average	  using	  the	  full	  sample	  weights	  provides	  in	  the	  ARMS	  data.	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This	  is	  suggestive	  that	  larger	  and	  better	  farms	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  marketing	  contracts.	   A	   much	   larger	   share	   of	   farms	   with	   marketing	   contracts	   carries	   debt	  comparing	  to	  farms	  not	  using	  marketing	  contracts;	  besides,	  the	  former	  group	  of	  farms	  has	  higher	  amounts	  of	  leverage	  than	  the	  latter	  (debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  ratio:	  0.20	  versus	  0.10).	  	  	  The	   farm	   operator	   and	   household	   characteristics	   for	   farms	   that	   primarily	   produce	  corn	  or	  soybeans	  are	  also	  described	  in	  Table	  16.	  The	  average	  operator	  age	  is	  55.	  As	  to	  education	  levels,	  7.5%	  lack	  a	  high	  school	  degree,	   the	  majority	  (72.1%)	  of	  producers	  have	  a	  high	  school	  degree	  or	  some	  college	  education	  (but	  have	  not	  finished	  college),	  roughly	  20.4%	  had	  graduated	   from	  college	  or	  beyond.	  The	  operators	  of	   farms	  with	  marketing	   contracts	   tend	   to	   be	   slightly	   younger	   (53	   vs.	   57)	   with	   shorter	   farming	  experience	   (28	   vs.	   30),	   and	   they	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   have	   higher	   education	   levels	  (Table	   16).	   Also,	   the	   operator	   households	   on	   farms	   that	   use	   marketing	   contracts	  receive	   a	   considerably	   lower	   share	   of	   income	   from	   off-­‐farm	   activities	   (56%	   versus	  72%).	   Summary	   statistics	   for	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	   sample	   (Table	   15)	   convey	   similar	  information;	  therefore,	  I	  will	  not	  reiterate	  the	  results	  here.	  	  	  
Table	  15.	  Characteristics	  of	  Farms	  by	  the	  Adoption	  of	  Marketing	  Contracts,	  All	  
Farms	  
	   Farms	  with	  
Marketing	  Contracts	  
Farms	  with	  No	  
Marketing	  Contracts	  
	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	  
Farm	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Acres	  Operated	   1,134.79	   1,673.63	   771.01	   3,052.62	  Acres	  Owned	   411.13	   900.99	   401.36	   1,741.49	  Gross	  Cash	  Farm	  Income	   457,146	   839,981	   210,725	   637,862	  Net	  Farm	  Income	   142,686	   407,138	   54,076	   284,759	  Share	  of	  total	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production	   0.90	   0.48	   0.84	   0.60	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Table	  15	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  Number	  of	  Commodities	  Produced	   2.76	   1.22	   2.57	   1.27	  Entropy	   0.25	   0.12	   0.24	   0.14	  Primary	  crop	  revenue	  share	   0.66	   0.19	   0.74	   0.21	  Debt	  dummy1	   0.82	   0.38	   0.61	   0.49	  Debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  ratio	   0.19	   3.64	   0.11	   1.87	  
Household	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Age	   52	   12.92	   57	   13.35	  Experience	   28	   14.19	   30	   15.45	  Education	   	   	   	   	  Less	  than	  high	  school	   0.04	   0.21	   0.09	   0.29	  High	  school	  and	  some	  college	   0.69	   0.46	   0.71	   0.45	  College	  and	  beyond	   0.26	   0.44	   0.20	   0.40	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  to	  Total	  household	  income	  ratio	   0.48	   2.49	   0.69	   1.69	  Non-­‐farm	  Asset	   294,926	   413,878	   253,060	   399,088	  
Observations	   21,834	   36,015	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms.	  	  	  
Table	   16.	   Characteristics	   of	   Farms	   by	   the	   Adoption	   of	   Marketing	   Contracts,	  
Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   Farms	  with	  
Marketing	  Contracts	  
Farms	  with	  No	  
Marketing	  Contracts	  
	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	  
Farm	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Acres	  Operated	   897.00	   1,231,69	   514.58	   1,029.06	  Acres	  Owned	   321.56	   601.99	   268.71	   723.15	  Gross	  Cash	  Farm	  Income	   461,963	   740,198	   230,558	   652,540	  Net	  Farm	  Income	   133,189	   325,325	   56,694	   278,118	  Share	  of	  total	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production	   0.91	   0.48	   0.86	   0.59	  Number	  of	  Commodities	  Produced	   2.59	   1.10	   2.46	   1.18	  Entropy	   0.23	   0.11	   0.23	   0.13	  Primary	  crop	  revenue	  share	   0.69	   0.16	   0.76	   0.19	  Debt	  dummy1	   0.80	   0.40	   0.60	   0.49	  Debt-­‐to-­‐asset	  ratio	   0.20	   4.41	   0.10	   0.32	  
Household	  Characteristics	   	   	   	   	  Age	   53	   12.98	   57	   13.34	  Experience	   27.93	   14.31	   30.28	   15.63	  Education	   	   	   	   	  Less	  than	  high	  school	   0.04	   0.19	   0.09	   0.29	  High	  school	  and	  some	  college	   0.70	   0.46	   0.73	   0.44	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Table	  16	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  College	  and	  beyond	   0.26	   0.44	   0.18	   0.38	  Off-­‐farm	  income	  to	  Total	  household	  income	  ratio	   0.56	   0.44	   0.72	   0.41	  Non-­‐farm	  Asset	   336,022	   455,171	   302,227	   467,172	  
Observations	   12,158	   21,079	  Note:	   Data	   from	   pooled	   ARMS	   data,	   2005-­‐2011.	   Sample	   includes	   all	   farms	   with	   cropland	   or	   self-­‐reported	  as	  crop	  farms,	  and	  with	  corn	  or	  soybean	  as	  the	  primary	  crop.	  	  	  
5.7	  Summary	  	  A	  descriptive	  analysis	  of	  producers’	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts	   for	  both	  samples	   is	  provided	  in	  this	  chapter.	  In	  summary,	  there	  are	  four	  important	  findings/implications.	  First,	   the	   producer	   adoption	   rate	   of	   marketing	   contracts	   is	   relatively	   low.	   On	   a	  national	   level16,	   only	   30%	   farms	   have	   marketing	   contracts	   for	   crops,	   while	   the	  participation	   in	  crop	   insurance	   is	  about	  62%	  of	   the	   farms	  purchase	  crop	   insurance.	  Second,	   farmers’	   decisions	   to	   adopt	   marketing	   contracts	   appears	   to	   be	   positively	  related	  to	  their	  use	  of	  crop	  insurance,	  whereas	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  share	  of	  production	  placed	  under	  marketing	   contracts	   and	   crop	   insurance	   is	   different	  when	  using	  different	  samples:	  for	  the	  “all-­‐farms”	  sample,	  the	  quantity	  contracted	  tend	  to	  be	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  crop	  insurance	  participation;	  while	  for	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample,	  such	  correlation	  disappears.	  Third,	   insured	  and	  uninsured	  farms	  are	  systematically	   different	   based	   on	   most	   observable	   characteristics,	   suggesting	   that	  they	   are	   also	   different	   based	   on	   un-­‐observables;	   consequently,	   crop	   insurance	  participation	   is	  potentially	  endogenous.	  Finally,	   farms	  with	  marketing	  contracts	  are	  associated	  with	  larger	  farm	  size,	  more	  gross	  and	  net	  farm	  income,	  and	  higher	  debt-­‐to-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  In	  calculating	  the	  summary	  statistics,	  the	  final	  sample	  is	  weighted	  with	  the	  full	  sample	  expansion	  factors	  provided	  in	  the	  ARMS	  data,	  such	  that	  the	  sample	  is	  representative	  of	  the	  “population”.	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asset	   ratio.	   Moreover,	   the	   operators	   of	   farms	   with	  marketing	   contracts	   tend	   to	   be	  slightly	   younger	   with	   less	   years	   of	   farming	   experience	   and	   have	   higher	   education	  levels.	  The	  ratio	  of	  off-­‐farm	  income	  to	  total	  household	  income	  is	  also	  much	  lower	  for	  contract	  farms.	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6.	  REGRESSION	  MODELS	  AND	  EMPIRICAL	  RESULTS	  
	  
6.1	  Introduction	  This	  chapter	  provides	  a	  farm-­‐level	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	   farmers’	   contracting	   behaviors.	   Two	   hypotheses	   are	   discussed.	   The	   analysis	   is	  conducted	   both	   with	   and	   without	   considering	   the	   potential	   endogeneity	   of	   crop	  insurance	  adoption;	  in	  each	  case,	  regression	  models	  are	  introduced	  to	  examine	  both	  the	  extensive	  (i.e.,	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  marketing	  contracts)	  and	  the	  intensive	  margins	  (the	   proportion	   of	   production	   placed	   under	   marketing	   contracts).	   This	   chapter	  provides	  insights	  into	  how	  farmers	  change	  their	  contracting	  behaviors	  in	  response	  to	  different	   crop	   insurance	   adoption	   decisions,	   controlling	   for	   other	   farm	   and	  personal/household	  characteristics.	  
	  
6.2	  Hypotheses	  Two	  hypotheses	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  participation	  on	  farmers’	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  are	  discussed	  in	  this	  section.	  	  
Hypothesis	  I:	  Negative	  Impact	  A	  negative	   impact	   indicates	  a	   “crowding	  out”	  effect	  of	   crop	   insurance	  on	  marketing	  contracts.	  Crop	  insurance	  is	  federally	  subsidized	  and	  the	  average	  subsidy	  rate	  over	  all	  coverage	   levels	   is	   about	   60%	   (Shields,	   2010);	   forward	   contracting	   is	   a	   private	   risk	  management	   tool	   available	   from	   the	   market	   without	   any	   subsidies	   from	   the	  government.	   In	   addition,	   with	  marketing	   contracts,	   farmers	   lock	   in	   the	   price	   for	   a	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crop,	  which	  helps	  avoid	  income	  losses	  resulting	  from	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  market	  price.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   also	   eliminates	   the	   possibility	   to	   earn	   higher	   revenues	   if	   the	  price	  rises.	  Unlike	  marketing/forward	  contracts,	  crop	  insurance	  does	  not	  set	  a	  ceiling	  on	  the	  crop	  revenues.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  revenue-­‐based	  policies,	  farmers	  are	  protected	   from	   both	   yield	   and	   price	   risks,	   while	  marketing	   contracts	   only	   address	  price	  risks.	  Therefore,	  given	  that	  a	  crop	  is	  insurable,	  a	  farmer	  might	  find	  it	  favorable	  to	  substitute	  crop	  insurance	  for	  all	  or	  part	  of	  his/her	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  for	  that	   crop.	   In	   this	   case,	   crop	   insurance	   crowds	   out	   marketing	   contracts.	   This	  “crowding	  out”	  effect	  might	  suggest	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  creating	  redundant	  subsidized	  risk	  protection	  programs	  that	  “substitute	  for	  private	  risk	  management	  tools	  that	  are	  readily	  available	  from	  the	  market”	  (Coble	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  	  
Hypothesis	  II:	  Positive	  Impact	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  crop	  insurance	  positively	  affect	  producers’	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts.	  This	   is	  possible	  because	  marketing	  contracts	  only	  deal	  with	  price	  risks,	  and	  they	  place	  delivery	  obligations	  on	  producers;	  crop	  insurance,	  on	  the	  other	   hand,	   could	   be	   utilized	   to	   manage	   production	   risks.	   In	   this	   sense,	   crop	  insurance	  could	  facilitate	  forward/	  marketing	  contracting	  by	  “providing	  resources	  to	  meet	  delivery	  obligations	   in	   the	  event	  of	  a	  production	   loss”	  (Collins	  &	  Bulut,	  2011).	  Accordingly,	   the	   adoption	   of	   crop	   insurance	   may	   encourage	   the	   use	   of	   marketing	  contracts.	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6.3	  Preliminary	  Estimation:	  Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  (OLS)	  Approach	  In	  this	  section,	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  farmers’	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  is	  estimated	  assuming	  that	  crop	  insurance	  participation	  is	  uncorrelated	  with	  the	  error	  term.	   Although	   this	   is	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   the	   case17,	   it	   is	   worthwhile	   to	   present	   the	  results	   and	   compare	   with	   the	   estimation	   results	   under	   the	   alternative	   assumption	  that	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   is	   endogenous	   to	   farmers’	   use	   of	   marketing	  contracts,	  so	  as	  to	  detect	  the	  direction	  and	  magnitude	  of	  estimation	  bias.	  
	  
6.3.1	  Estimation	  Framework	  
Extensive	  Margin	  (whether	  a	  farmer	  uses	  any	  marketing	  contracts	  in	  year	  t)	  A	  linear	  probability	  model	  (LPM)	  allows	  for	  the	  use	  of	  fixed	  effects	  and	  instrumental	  variables,	  which	  cannot	  be	  easily	  and	  properly	  done	  with	  non-­‐linear	  models;	  besides,	  interpretation	   with	   LPM	   is	   more	   intuitive	   and	   convenient.	   Therefore,	   a	   linear	  probability	  model	  is	  employed	  to	  estimate	  how	  farmers’	  decision	  to	  adopt	  marketing	  contracts	   is	   affected	   by	   their	   participation	   in	   crop	   insurance.	   Specifically,	   a	   binary	  variable	  (MCit)	  indicating	  whether	  a	  marketing	  contract	  is	  used	  on	  farm	  i	  in	  year	  t	  is	  regressed	   on	   a	   dummy	   variable	   (CIit)	   	   representing	   crop	   insurance	   status.	   Farm	  characteristics	   (Fit)	   and	   household	   characteristics	   (Xit)	   are	   controlled	   in	   the	  regressions.	  A	  state	  fixed-­‐effect18	  (𝛿!)	  is	  also	  included	  in	  the	  model.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  unobserved	  risk	  aversion	  is	  likely	  to	  positively	  affect	  both	  crop	  insurance	  and	  marketing	  contract	  decisions.	  Besides,	  farmers	  may	  make	  contract	  and	  insurance	  decisions	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  18	  I	   intended	   to	   use	   county-­‐level	   fixed-­‐effects,	   however,	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   respondent	   burden,	   the	  ARMS	  uses	  a	  sampling	  design	  that	  minimizes	  overlap	  between	  the	  current	  year’s	  ARMS	  Phase	  I	  sample,	  last	  year’s	  ARMS	  Phase	  I	  sample,	  and	  other	  NASS	  surveys	  (USDA-­‐NASS).	  Consequently,	  the	  number	  of	  farms	  that	  are	  available	  for	  sampling	  may	  be	  much	  smaller	  than	  the	  total	  number	  of	  farms	  in	  the	  target	  population.	  This	  becomes	  a	  problem	  if	  a	  county-­‐level	   fixed-­‐effect	   is	  applied	  and	  there	  are	  only	  a	   few	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   𝑀𝐶!" =   𝑎 +   𝑏𝐶𝐼!" +   𝑚𝐹!" + 𝑛𝑋!" + 𝑢!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  	  
Intensive	  Margin	  (the	  share	  of	  production	  under	  marketing	  contracts)	  Conditional	   on	   having	   a	   marketing	   contract,	   the	   intensive	   margin	   is	   examined	   by	  regressing	  the	  fraction	  of	  production	  placed	  under	  marketing	  contracts	  (MCqshareit)	  on	  the	  same	  set	  of	  independent	  variables	  as	  included	  in	  the	  regression	  for	  “extensive	  margin”.	   𝑀𝐶𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽𝐶𝐼!" +   𝛾𝐹!" + 𝜃𝑋!" + 𝜀!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  	  As	   the	   extensive	  margin	   and	   intensive	  margin	   are	   estimated	   separately,	   similar	   to	  Katchova	   and	  Miranda	   (2004),	   the	   restrictive	   assumption	   that	   farm	   and	   household	  characteristics	   influence	   the	   adoption	   decision	   and	   the	   quantity	   contracted	   in	   the	  same	  way	   is	   relaxed	   in	   the	  present	  study.	  Therefore,	   the	  sign	  and	  magnitude	  of	   the	  coefficients	   in	   the	   two	   regressions	   for	   extensive	   and	   intensive	   margins	   are	   not	  necessarily	  the	  same.	  	  
6.3.2	  Empirical	  Results	  Table	   17	   presents	   the	   results	   for	   the	   regressions	   discussed	   above,	   columns	   (1)	  through	   (4)	  exhibit	   the	   results	   for	   the	  extensive	  margin:	   in	   column	  (1)	  and	   (2),	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  farms	  in	  some	  counties;	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  sampling	  error	  would	  likely	  to	  be	  large	  and	  increase	  the	  noise	  in	  the	  estimation.	  In	  contrast,	  there	  are	  more	  farms	  in	  a	  state	  than	  in	  an	  individual	  county	  within	  that	  state,	  hence	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  encounter	  the	  preceding	  problem	  with	  state	  fixed-­‐effects;	  in	  addition,	  the	  phase	   III	   CRR	   sample	   is	   designed	   to	   represent	   all	   agriculture	   in	   the	   state	   (Banker,	   ERS	   and	   Hicks,	  NASS),	   so	   that	   indications	   at	   the	   state	   level	   should	   be	   statistically	   reliable.	   Therefore,	   a	   state-­‐level	  fixed-­‐effect	  may	  be	  more	  appropriate	  to	  use	  than	  county	  fixed-­‐effects.	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“all-­‐farms”	  sample	  is	  used	  in	  the	  regressions,	  while	  column	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  are	  for	  corn	  or	  soybeans	   farms	   only	   (“corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample).	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   the	  pooled	  ARMS	  dataset	  is	  not	  a	  panel,	  hence	  in	  column	  (1)	  and	  (3),	  a	  state-­‐level	  fixed-­‐effect	   is	   applied	   to	   control	   for	   potential	   cross-­‐sectional	   heterogeneity	   that	   is	   time-­‐invariant.	  	  	  
Table	  17.	  Regression	  Results—OLS	  Estimation	  
Dependent	  
Variable	  
Any	  Marketing	  Contracts	   Fraction	  of	  Production	  
Contracted	  
	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
Crop	  	   0.109***	   0.107***	   0.102***	   0.101***	   -­‐0.0257***	   -­‐0.00297	  
Insurance	   (0.00515)	   (0.00514)	   (0.00703)	   (0.00702)	   (0.00596)	   (0.00798)	  
Age	   -­‐0.00555***	   -­‐0.00567***	   -­‐0.00553***	   -­‐0.00568***	   -­‐0.00374**	   -­‐0.00413*	  
	   (0.00151)	   (0.00150)	   (0.00202)	   (0.00202)	   (0.00164)	   (0.00214)	  
Age2	   0.0000344**	   0.0000351**	   0.0000300	   0.0000309*	   0.0000466***	   0.0000468**	  
	   (0.0000138)	   (0.0000137)	   (0.0000184)	   (0.0000184)	   (0.0000155)	   (0.0000202)	  
Experience	   0.000196	   0.000203	   -­‐0.00101	   -­‐0.00103	   -­‐0.00287***	   -­‐0.00233**	  
	   (0.000739)	   (0.000737)	   (0.000991)	   (0.000988)	   (0.000819)	   (0.00106)	  
Experience2	   -­‐0.0000127	   -­‐0.0000144	   0.00000651	   0.00000538	   0.0000210	   0.0000182	  
	   (0.0000115)	   (0.0000115)	   (0.0000153)	   (0.0000153)	   (0.0000133)	   (0.0000172)	  
High	  School	  &	   0.0139	   0.00903	   0.0200*	   0.0149	   0.0107	   0.00906	  
	  	  Some	  College	   (0.00902)	   (0.00900)	   (0.0119)	   (0.0119)	   (0.0113)	   (0.0153)	  
College	  &	   0.0428***	   0.0391***	   0.0523***	   0.0481***	   0.0207*	   0.0245	  
	  	  Beyond	   (0.00976)	   (0.00973)	   (0.0131)	   (0.0131)	   (0.0117)	   (0.0159)	  
Off-­‐farm	   -­‐0.00415***	   -­‐0.00391***	   -­‐0.00530***	   -­‐0.00504***	   0.000782	   -­‐0.000860	  
	  	  Income	   (0.00134)	   (0.00133)	   (0.00193)	   (0.00193)	   (0.00126)	   (0.00179)	  
Leverage_1	   -­‐0.113***	   -­‐0.119***	   -­‐0.128***	   -­‐0.132***	   	   	  
	   (0.00771)	   (0.00769)	   (0.0104)	   (0.0104)	   	   	  
Leverage_2	   -­‐0.0766***	   -­‐0.0797***	   -­‐0.0940***	   -­‐0.0956***	   -­‐0.00742	   -­‐0.0201	  
	   (0.00604)	   (0.00602)	   (0.00832)	   (0.00830)	   (0.00966)	   (0.0129)	  
Leverage_3	   -­‐0.0238***	   -­‐0.0270***	   -­‐0.0281***	   -­‐0.0300***	   -­‐0.0268***	   -­‐0.0377***	  
	   (0.00533)	   (0.00531)	   (0.00719)	   (0.00718)	   (0.00932)	   (0.0124)	  
Leverage_4	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.00774	   -­‐0.00986	  
	   	   	   	   	   (0.00949)	   (0.0127)	  
Crop	  Income	   0.286***	   0.263***	   0.291***	   0.267***	   -­‐0.139***	   -­‐0.138***	  
	  	  Share	   (0.0103)	   (0.0103)	   (0.0141)	   (0.0144)	   (0.0124)	   (0.0164)	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Table	  17	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  
Crop	  Income	   -­‐0.0893***	   -­‐0.0844***	   -­‐0.0892***	   -­‐0.0838***	   0.00839*	   0.00372	  
	  	  Share2	   (0.00379)	   (0.00380)	   (0.00515)	   (0.00517)	   (0.00454)	   (0.00597)	  
Primary	  Crop	   -­‐0.260***	   -­‐0.271***	   -­‐0.236***	   -­‐0.254***	   -­‐0.123***	   -­‐0.0319	  
	  	  Revenue	  Share	   (0.0138)	   (0.0138)	   (0.0203)	   (0.0204)	   (0.0166)	   (0.0232)	  
Revenue	   -­‐0.0551***	   -­‐0.0512***	   -­‐0.0425***	   -­‐0.0387***	   -­‐0.0201***	   -­‐0.0141***	  
	   (0.00271)	   (0.00271)	   (0.00357)	   (0.00359)	   (0.00313)	   (0.00408)	  
Revenue2	   0.00504***	   0.00471***	   0.00424***	   0.00391***	   0.00126***	   0.000742***	  
	   (0.000165)	   (0.000167)	   (0.000222)	   (0.000224)	   (0.000186)	   (0.000243)	  
Entropy	   -­‐0.163***	   -­‐0.171***	   -­‐0.216***	   -­‐0.221***	   -­‐0.260***	   -­‐0.414***	  
	   (0.0214)	   (0.0214)	   (0.0291)	   (0.0290)	   (0.0254)	   (0.0331)	  
2006	   	   0.0381***	   	   0.0285***	   0.0537***	   0.0735***	  	   (0.00730)	   	   (0.0102)	   (0.00812)	   (0.0113)	  
2007	   	   0.0380***	   	   0.0312**	   0.0784***	   0.0688***	  	   (0.0112)	   	   (0.0155)	   (0.0115)	   (0.0156)	  
2008	   	   0.114***	   	   0.119***	   0.0449***	   0.0890***	  	   (0.00750)	   	   (0.0104)	   (0.00783)	   (0.0106)	  
2009	   	   0.0242***	   	   0.0258**	   0.0303***	   0.0710***	  	   (0.00748)	   	   (0.0104)	   (0.00827)	   (0.0111)	  
2010	   	   0.0763***	   	   0.0653***	   0.0661***	   0.112***	  	   (0.00747)	   	   (0.00991)	   (0.00810)	   (0.0107)	  
2011	   	   0.0994***	   	   0.0806***	   0.0705***	   0.111***	  	   (0.00777)	   	   (0.0108)	   (0.00821)	   (0.0112)	  
Observations	   45,433	   45,433	   25,043	   25,043	   17,284	   9,513	  
R-­‐squared	   0.137	   0.144	   0.132	   0.138	   0.048	   0.075	  
State	  FE	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Year	  FE	   No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  Notes:	  Columns	  (1)	  –(4)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  extensive	  margin,	  column	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  intensive	  margin.	  Column	  (1)	  and	  (3)	  have	  no	  year	  fixed	  effects,	  the	  other	  columns	  have	  both	  state	  fixed	  effects	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects.	  Independent	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  a	  dummy	  for	  adopting	  crop	   insurance,	   age,	   age	   squared,	   experience	   in	   years,	   experience	   squared,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	  high	   school	   or	   attending	   some	   college,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	   college	   or	   attending/completing	  graduate	  school,	  ratio	  of	  off-­‐farm	  income	  to	  total	  household	  income,	  dummies	  for	  being	  in	  the	  lowest,	  second	   lowest,	   second	   highest,	   highest	   quartiles	   of	   leverage,	   share	   of	   farm	   income	   from	   crop	  production,	  crop	  income	  share	  squared,	  share	  of	  crop	  revenue	  from	  the	  primary	  crop,	  log	  of	  previous	  year’s	  farm	  sales,	  log	  farm	  revenue	  squared,	  and	  a	  measure	  of	  crop	  diversification	  (entropy).	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  Single	  asterisk	  (*)	  indicates	  significance	  at	  the	  90th	  percentile,	  double	  asterisks	  (**)	   indicate	   significance	   at	   the	  95th	   percentile,	   triple	   asterisks	   (***)	   indicate	   significance	   at	   the	  99th	  percentile.	  	  	  	  	  Regressions	  using	  both	  samples	  give	  similar	  results	  except	  for	  some	  differences	  in	  the	  magnitude	   of	   point	   estimates:	   consistent	   with	   the	   descriptive	   analysis,	   farms	   with	  crop	   insurance	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   also	   adopt	   marketing	   contracts:	   on	   average,	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switching	  from	  uninsured	  to	  insured	  would	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  to	  use	  marketing	  contracts	  by	  about	  10	  to	  11	  percentage	  points.	  	  	  Results	  also	  show	  that	   farms	  with	  higher	  debt-­‐to	  asset	  ratios	  are	  more	   likely	  to	  use	  marketing	  contracts.	  Hedging	  theories	  predict	  that	  farms	  with	  higher	  leverage	  levels	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  hedge,	  because	  hedging	  aids	  in	  reducing	  the	  probability	  of	  financial	  distress	  (Ertugrul,	  Sezer	  and	  Sirmans,	  2008);	   forward	  contracting	  has	  similar	  effect,	  therefore	  it	  is	  also	  positively	  related	  to	  leverage.	  	  The	  adoption	  decision	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  is	  found	  to	  be	  increasing	  in	  gross	  farm	  revenue,	  ceteris	  paribus.	  The	  linear	  term	  measuring	  farm	  revenues	  is	  negative;	  while	  the	   quadratic	   term	   is	   positive,	   the	   inflection	   point	   is	   very	   small,	   97%	   of	   the	  observations	   lie	   on	   the	   right-­‐hand	   side	   of	   the	   inflection	   point,	   thus	   it	   exhibits	   a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  gross	  farm	  revenue	  and	  marketing	  contracts	  adoption.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  summary	  statistics	  as	  well	  as	  earlier	  studies	  and	  reports,	  it	  might	  be	   linked	   to	   the	   economies	  of	   size	   in	   the	  utilization	  of	   forward	  pricing	   tools.	  Other	   farm	   characteristics	   that	   have	   significant	   influences	   are	   the	   primary	   crop	  revenue	  share	  (share	  of	  crop	  revenue	  from	  the	  primary	  crop)	  and	  the	  share	  of	  total	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production.	  Primary	  crop	  revenue	  share	  negatively	  affects	  the	  likelihood	  to	  adopt	  marketing	  contracts,	  which	  agrees	  with	  the	  summary	  statistics	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  As	  for	  crop	  production	  share	  in	  gross	  farm	  income,	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  linear	   term	   is	  positive,	   and	   the	  quadratic	   term	  does	  not	  offset	   the	   linear	   term	  until	  crop	   income	   share	   approaches	   1.6	   —	   only	   about	   6%	   of	   the	   observations	   in	   both	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sample	   are	   found	   in	   the	   area	   to	   the	   right	   of	   this	   inflection	  point.	   Accordingly,	   after	  controlling	   for	   other	   factors,	   the	   probability	   of	   using	   crop	   marketing	   contracts	   is	  increasing	  in	  crop	  income	  share,	  which	  measures	  how	  important	  crop	  production	  is	  on	  a	  farm.	  	  	  Age	   and	  marketing	   contract	   adoption	   are	   negatively	   related19.	   Farming	   experience	  appears	   to	   have	   no	   correlations	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   marketing	   contracts,	   as	   the	  coefficients	   of	   both	   the	   linear	   and	   the	   quadratic	   terms	   are	   small	   and	   insignificant.	  Operator’s	   education	   level	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   their	   use	   of	  marketing	   contracts,	  which	  corresponds	   to	  evidence	   found	   in	  previous	   literature.	  Crop	  diversity	  and	  off-­‐farm	   employment	   or	   investment	   are	   also	   strategies	   used	   by	   farmers	   to	   address	  income	   risks,	   as	   expected,	   they	   negatively	   affect	   farmers’	   adoption	   decisions	   on	  marketing	  contracts.	  	  	  Heterogeneity	  that	  is	  constant	  across	  individuals	  but	  varies	  over	  time	  may	  also	  exist.	  For	   example,	   agricultural	   policies	   may	   change	   by	   year,	   but	   within	   each	   year,	   the	  policy	   has	   a	   national-­‐level	   impact.	   Therefore	   in	   column	   (2)	   and	   column	   (4),	   a	   year	  fixed	   effects	   is	   added	   to	   the	   regressions.	   Including	   the	   year	   fixed-­‐effects	   does	   not	  affect	  the	  results	  profoundly	  except	  for	  slightly	  changing	  the	  point	  estimates	  for	  most	  variables.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  quadratic	  term	  does	  not	  offset	  the	  linear	  term	  until	  age	  81	  for	  the	  “all-­‐farms”	  sample	  (92	  for	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample),	  very	  few	  observations	  fall	  into	  the	  area	  to	  the	  right	  of	  this	  value.	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Results	  for	  the	  intensive	  margin	  are	  described	  in	  column	  (5)	  and	  (6),	  both	  state-­‐level	  and	   year	   fixed	   effects	   are	   applied.	   Estimates	   for	   the	   coefficient	   of	   crop	   insurance	  participation	   are	   different	   when	   using	   different	   samples	   in	   regressions.	   The	  proportion	   of	   production	   contracted	   is	   found	   to	   be	   negatively	   affected	   by	   crop	  insurance	   adoption	   if	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	   sample	   is	   used;	   whereas	   for	   “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample,	  no	  significant	  relationship	  is	  discovered	  between	  crop	  insurance	  and	  the	  share	  of	  production	  under	  marketing	  contracts.	  	  	  Estimates	   for	  most	   other	   covariates	   are	   similar	   for	   both	   samples.	   Compared	   to	   the	  extensive	  margin	  results,	  most	  of	  the	  factors	  do	  not	  affect	  the	  intensive	  margin	  in	  the	  same	  way:	  the	  coefficient	  of	  crop	  insurance	  participation	  becomes	  negative;	  off-­‐farm	  income	  and	   two	  of	   the	   leverage	  dummies	   lose	   significance;	   the	   experience	   variable	  becomes	  significant	  and	  negatively	  affects	  the	  intensive	  margin;	  the	  inflection	  point	  of	  age	   becomes	   smaller	   (40	   for	   the	   “all	   farms”	   sample	   and	  44	   for	   the	   “corn/soybeans	  farms”	   sample);	   and	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   coefficient	   for	   crop	   income	   share	   has	   also	  changed:	  farmers	  who	  obtain	  smaller	  shares	  of	  their	  farm	  revenues	  from	  crops	  place	  larger	  proportion	  of	  the	  crop	  production	  under	  marketing	  contracts,	  ceteris	  paribus.	  This	   is	   reasonable	   because	   in	   case	   of	   a	   production	   shortfall,	   contracting	   more	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  not	  being	  able	  to	  meet	  the	  delivery	  commitment	  without	  buying	  on	  spot	  markets	  at	  uncertain	  prices,	  as	  a	  result,	   it	   increases	   the	  uncertainty	  of	  crop	  revenue	   as	   well	   as	   total	   farm	   incomes.	   Given	   that	   other	   factors	   remain	   constant,	  farmers	  with	  greater	  reliance	  on	  crop	  revenues	  are	   likely	   to	  contract	   less	   to	  reduce	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such	  risks,	  because	   in	  general,	  people	  want	  their	  main	  source	  of	   income	  to	  be	  more	  stable.	  	  	  To	  summarize,	  farmers’	  decision	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts	  is	  positively	  correlated	   with	   the	   participation	   in	   crop	   insurance,	   while	   conditional	   on	   adopting	  marketing	   contracts,	   the	   intensive	  margin	   is	   negatively	   affected	   by	   crop	   insurance	  participation	  for	  the	  “all	  farms”	  sample	  and	  relatively	  unrelated	  to	  crop	  insurance	  for	  corn/soybeans	   farms.	   Other	   farm	   and	   household	   characteristics	   that	   significantly	  affect	   marketing	   contract	   adoption	   are	   gross	   farm	   revenue,	   crop	   income	   share,	  primary	   crop	   revenue	   share,	   crop	   diversity,	   off-­‐farm	   income,	   operators’	   age	   and	  education	   level,	   and	   leverage.	  The	   same	   factors	  affect	   the	  extensive	  margin	  and	   the	  intensive	  margin	  differently.	  
	  
	  
6.4	   Endogeneity	   of	   Crop	   Insurance	   and	   Two-­‐Stage	   Least	   Squares	   (2SLS)	  
Approach	  
	  
6.4.1	  Identification	  Problem	  Heterogeneity	   in	   both	   observable	   and	   unobservable	   factors	   would	   affect	   farmers’	  decisions	  on	  marketing	  contracts	  as	  well	  as	  crop	  insurance.	  Farmers’	  risk	  tolerance,	  which	  is	  unobserved	  in	  the	  ARMS	  data,	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  both	  crop	  insurance	  and	   contracting	   decisions:	   intuitively,	   farmers	   with	   lower	   risk	   tolerance	   are	   more	  likely	  to	  adopt	  both	  marketing	  contracts	  and	  crop	  insurance	  than	  those	  who	  are	  more	  risk-­‐tolerant	  or	   less	   risk-­‐averse.	  As	  a	   result,	   crop	   insurance	  may	  be	  correlated	  with	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the	  error	  term;	  ignoring	  such	  correlation	  would	  likely	  cause	  positive	  estimation	  bias.	  In	   addition,	   crop	   insurance	   and	   marketing	   contracts	   decisions	   may	   be	   made	  simultaneously;	   neglecting	   the	   simultaneity	   may	   cause	   invalid	   inferences	   and	  incorrect	   conclusions	   to	   be	   made	   (Velandia	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   The	   summary	   statistics	  presented	   in	   Chapter	   5	   provide	   some	   evidence	   for	   this	   argument:	   insured	   and	  uninsured	   farms	   are	   systematically	   different	   from	  each	  other	   based	  on	  most	   of	   the	  observable	   characteristics,	   suggesting	   that	   they	   are	   also	   different	   based	   on	   un-­‐observables,	  which	  implies	  the	  endogeneity	  of	  crop	  insurance.	  	  	  
6.4.2	  Identification	  Strategy	  To	   address	   the	   endogeneity	   problem,	   an	   instrumental	   variable	   for	   crop	   insurance	  participation	   is	   introduced	   and	   a	   two-­‐stage	   least	   squares	   approach	   is	   employed	   to	  carry	  out	  a	  farm-­‐level	  analysis.	  A	  valid	  instrument	  should	  have	  two	  properties:	  1)	  it	  is	  related	  to	  farmers’	  adoption	  decisions	  of	  crop	  insurance	  (instrument	  relevance);	  2)	  it	   is	   not	   directly	   correlated	  with	   farmers’	   marketing	   contract	   decisions	   (exclusion	  
restriction).	  	  	  The	  crop	  insurance	  loss	  ratio	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  insurance	  payments	  (indemnity)	  to	  total	  premiums;	  if	  the	  premium	  rate	  is	  actuarially	  fair,	  on	  average,	  the	  indemnities	  should	  be	  equal	  to	  the	  total	  premiums,	  which	  results	  in	  a	  loss	  ratio	  of	  1.	  A	  higher	  loss	  ratio	  indicates	  higher	  return	  to	  crop	  insurance,	  hence	  increasing	  the	  likelihood	  for	  farmers	  to	  purchase	  crop	  insurance.	  However,	  if	  simply	  using	  the	  lagged	  loss	  ratio	  (loss	  ratio	  from	   last	   year)	   as	   an	   exogenous	   instrumental	   variable,	   problems	   may	   arise	   since	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there	  might	  be	  exceptional	   losses	   in	  one	  year,	  which	  will	  misrepresent	   the	   “normal	  loss	  level”.	  	  	  Therefore,	  I	  follow	  Goodwin’s	  (1993)	  approach	  here	  and	  create	  a	  county-­‐level	  “loss-­‐risk”	  variable	  measuring	  an	  individual	  county’s	  likelihood	  of	  collecting	  indemnities	  in	  excess	  of	  its	  total	  premiums.	  Using	  the	  county-­‐level	  summary	  of	  business	  (SOB)	  data	  from	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Agency	  (RMA),	  the	  “loss-­‐risk”	  term	  is	  constructed	  as	  the	  simple	   average	   of	   the	   county’s	   preceding	   ten	   years’	   normalized	   loss	   ratios 20 .	  Specifically,	  this	  term	  is	  given	  by	  the	  following	  formula:	  	  	  
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!" =    𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!!!!"!!!!! /10	  	  where	   	  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"	  is	  the	  loss	  ratio	  for	  county	   i	   in	  year	  s,	  and	  	  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!	  is	  the	  state	  average	  loss	  ratio	  in	  year	  s.	  	  	  Counties	  with	   larger	   loss-­‐risk	  values	  have	  a	  relatively	  higher	  chance	  to	  collect	  more	  indemnities	  than	  the	  total	  premium	  payments,	  that	  is,	  crop	  insurance	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	   underpriced	   in	   these	   counties	   compared	   to	   other	   counties	   with	   lower	   loss-­‐risk	  values	  in	  the	  same	  state.	  Accordingly,	  the	  county-­‐level	  loss-­‐risk	  reflects	  the	  actuarial	  performance	   of	   crop	   insurance	   pricing	   in	   an	   individual	   county21.	   Therefore,	   the	  likelihood	  to	  adopt	  crop	  insurance	  may	  be	  higher	  for	  farmers	  in	  counties	  with	  larger	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Normalized	  loss	  ratio	  =	  annual	  county-­‐level	  loss	  ratio/annual	  state	  average	  loss	  ratio	  21	  All	  farmers	  in	  a	  county	  face	  the	  same	  premium	  structure.	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loss-­‐risk	  values,	  in	  other	  words,	  loss-­‐risk	  and	  crop	  insurance	  adoption	  are	  positively	  correlated	  (instrument	  relevance).	  	  	  To	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  loss-­‐risk	  as	  the	  instrumental	  variable,	  one	  more	  condition	  needs	  to	  be	  met:	  it	  should	  be	  uncorrelated	  with	  the	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts,	  other	  than	  through	   its	   correlation	   with	   crop	   insurance	   adoption	   (the	   exclusion	   restriction).	  This	  condition	  should	  be	  satisfied	  since	  loss-­‐risk	  reflects	  the	  actuarial	  performance	  of	  crop	  insurance	  pricing,	  which	  is	  more	  related	  to	  exogenous	  policies	  and	  is	  unlikely	  to	  directly	   affect	   farmers’	   use	   of	   marketing	   contracts	   or	   be	   correlated	   with	   other	  unobservable	   factors	   that	   may	   influence	   their	   contracting	   decisions	   (that	   is,	  uncorrelated	  with	  the	  error	  term	  in	  the	  main	  regression).	  After	  satisfying	  the	  above	  two	  conditions	  (instrument	  relevance	  and	  exclusion	  restriction),	  “loss-­‐risk”	  should	  be	  a	  valid	  instrument.	  
	  
6.4.3	  Estimation	  Framework	  




Second-­‐Stage	  Regression	  The	  predicted	  value	  of	  CIit	  is	  obtained	  from	  the	  first-­‐stage	  regression	  and	  used	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  in	  the	  second	  stage	  regressions.	  
	  
Extensive	  margin	  (whether	  a	  farmer	  uses	  any	  marketing	  contracts	  in	  year	  t)	  The	  same	  linear	  probability	  model	  as	  employed	  in	  the	  preliminary	  estimation	  is	  used	  to	  examine	   the	  extensive	  margin,	  except	   that	   the	  actual	   crop	   insurance	  status	  𝐶𝐼!"	  is	  replaced	  with	  the	  predicted	  value	  𝐶𝐼!"	  obtained	  from	  the	  first-­‐stage	  regression.	  	   𝑀𝐶!" =   𝑎 +   𝑏𝐶𝐼!" +   𝑚𝐹!" + 𝑛𝑋!" + 𝑢!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  
	  
Intensive	  margin	  (the	  share	  of	  production	  under	  marketing	  contracts)	  Method	   used	   to	   estimate	   the	   intensive	   margin	   is	   also	   the	   same	   as	   that	   in	   the	  preliminary	  estimation,	  with	  the	  regression	  model	  being	  modified	  by	  substituting	  𝐶𝐼!"	  for	  𝐶𝐼!" .	  	   𝑀𝐶𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽𝐶𝐼!" +   𝛾𝐹!" + 𝜃𝑋!" + 𝜀!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  	  where	  𝐶𝐼!"	  is	  the	  predicted	  value	  of	  𝐶𝐼!"	  from	  the	  first	  stage	  regression.	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6.4.4	  Empirical	  Results	  Regressions	   are	   conducted	   for	   both	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	   sample	   and	   the	   “corn/soybeans	  farms”	   sample.	   Results	   from	   the	   first-­‐stage	   and	   second-­‐stage	   regressions	   are	  reported.	  
	  
Extensive	  Margin	  
I.	  First-­‐Stage	  Regression	  The	   extensive	   margin	   is	   first	   examined.	   The	   first-­‐stage	   regression	   results	   are	  reported	   in	   Table	   18.	   Column	   (1)	   and	   (2)	   present	   the	   results	   for	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	  sample.	  In	  column	  (1),	  the	  county-­‐level	  lagged	  loss	  ratio	  (loss	  ratio	  from	  last	  year)	  is	  used	  as	   the	   instrument;	   in	  column	  (2),	   results	  using	   loss-­‐risk	  as	   the	   instrument	  are	  reported.	   By	   comparison,	   loss-­‐risk	   should	   be	   superior	   to	   lagged	   loss	   ratio	   as	   an	  instrument,	  given	  a	  much	  larger	  F-­‐statistic	  on	  the	  excluded	  instrument	  for	  the	  former.	  Column	   (3)	   and	   (4)	   exhibit	   the	   results	   for	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample.	  Likewise,	  column	  (3)	  gives	  the	  results	  with	  lagged	  loss	  ratio	  as	  the	  instrument;	  while	  in	   column	   (4),	   the	   instrument	   is	   loss-­‐risk.	   As	   expected,	   the	   first-­‐stage	   results	   show	  that	  crop	  insurance	  adoption	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  loss-­‐risk.	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Table	  18.	  First-­‐Stage	  Results,	  Extensive	  Margin	  
Dependent	  Variable	   Crop	  Insurance	  Participation	  	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   0.00712**	   	   0.00525	   	  
	   (0.00280)	   	   (0.00431)	   	  
Loss-­‐Risk	   	   0.0432***	   	   0.0173**	  
	   	   (0.00472)	   	   (0.00675)	  
Age	   0.0000798	   0.000175	   0.00102	   0.00106	  
	   (0.00137)	   (0.00137)	   (0.00182)	   (0.00182)	  
Age2	   -­‐0.0000128	   -­‐0.0000135	   -­‐0.0000233	   -­‐0.0000235	  
	   (0.0000125)	   (0.0000125)	   (0.0000166)	   (0.0000166)	  
Experience	   0.00314***	   0.00314***	   0.00105	   0.00103	  
	   (0.000673)	   (0.000673)	   (0.000891)	   (0.000891)	  
Experience2	   -­‐0.0000203*	   -­‐0.0000199*	   0.0000134	   0.0000137	  
	   (0.0000105)	   (0.0000105)	   (0.0000138)	   (0.0000138)	  
High	  School	  &	   0.128***	   0.128***	   0.139***	   0.139***	  
	  	  Some	  College	   (0.00820)	   (0.00819)	   (0.0107)	   (0.0107)	  
College	  &	   0.151***	   0.151***	   0.171***	   0.171***	  
	  	  Beyond	   (0.00887)	   (0.00886)	   (0.0117)	   (0.0117)	  
Off-­‐farm	   -­‐0.00254**	   -­‐0.00255**	   -­‐0.00189	   -­‐0.00189	  
	  	  Income	   (0.00122)	   (0.00122)	   (0.00174)	   (0.00174)	  
Leverage_1	   -­‐0.166***	   -­‐0.167***	   -­‐0.179***	   -­‐0.179***	  
	   (0.00699)	   (0.00698)	   (0.00934)	   (0.00933)	  
Leverage_2	   -­‐0.0759***	   -­‐0.0764***	   -­‐0.0890***	   -­‐0.0891***	  
	   (0.00549)	   (0.00548)	   (0.00746)	   (0.00746)	  
Leverage_3	   -­‐0.0326***	   -­‐0.0329***	   -­‐0.0390***	   -­‐0.0391***	  
	   (0.00485)	   (0.00485)	   (0.00647)	   (0.00647)	  
Crop	  Income	   0.202***	   0.204***	   0.188***	   0.189***	  
	  	  Share	   (0.00940)	   (0.00939)	   (0.0129)	   (0.0129)	  
Crop	  Income	   -­‐0.0638***	   -­‐0.0644***	   -­‐0.0570***	   -­‐0.0572***	  
	  	  Share2	   (0.00346)	   (0.00345)	   (0.00465)	   (0.00465)	  
Primary	  Crop	   -­‐0.132***	   -­‐0.136***	   -­‐0.231***	   -­‐0.233***	  
	  	  Revenue	  Share	   (0.0126)	   (0.0126)	   (0.0183)	   (0.0184)	  
Revenue	   -­‐0.0427***	   -­‐0.0427***	   -­‐0.0440***	   -­‐0.0441***	  
	   (0.00247)	   (0.00247)	   (0.00322)	   (0.00322)	  
Revenue2	   0.00452***	   0.00453***	   0.00468***	   0.00469***	  
	   (0.000151)	   (0.000151)	   (0.000200)	   (0.000200)	  
Entropy	   -­‐0.152***	   -­‐0.157***	   -­‐0.135***	   -­‐0.138***	  
	   (0.0196)	   (0.0195)	   (0.0262)	   (0.0262)	  
2006	   -­‐0.00693	   -­‐0.00877	   -­‐0.0150	   -­‐0.0160*	  
	   (0.00669)	   (0.00666)	   (0.00922)	   (0.00920)	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Table	  18	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  
2007	   0.0781***	   0.0779***	   0.0822***	   0.0811***	  
	   (0.0102)	   (0.0102)	   (0.0140)	   (0.0140)	  
2008	   0.0367***	   0.0355***	   0.0350***	   0.0343***	  
	   (0.00685)	   (0.00685)	   (0.00937)	   (0.00936)	  
2009	   0.0250***	   0.0245***	   0.0206**	   0.0219**	  
	   (0.00688)	   (0.00683)	   (0.00947)	   (0.00934)	  
2010	   0.00619	   0.000332	   0.00850	   0.00485	  
	   (0.00705)	   (0.00682)	   (0.00928)	   (0.00894)	  
2011	   0.0173**	   0.0166**	   0.0110	   0.0114	  
	   (0.00711)	   (0.00709)	   (0.00976)	   (0.00973)	  
Observations	   45,393	   45,408	   25,026	   25,032	  
R-­‐squared	   0.126	   0.128	   0.149	   0.149	  
F-­‐statistic	  for	  
Excluded	  Instrument	   6.46	   83.81	   1.49	   6.60	  
Probability>F	   0.011	   0.000	   0.223	   0.0102	  
Instrument	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	  Notes:	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  the	  “all	  farms”	  sample,	  column	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  report	  the	  results	   for	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample.	   In	   column	   (1)	  and	   (3),	   the	   loss	   ratio	   from	   last	  year	   is	  used	   as	   an	   instrument;	   in	   column	   (2)	   and	   (4),	   the	   instrument	   is	   “loss-­‐risk”.	   Other	   independent	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  age,	  age	  squared,	  experience	  in	  years,	  experience	  squared,	  a	  dummy	  for	   completing	   high	   school	   or	   attending	   some	   college,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	   college	   or	  attending/completing	  graduate	   school,	   ratio	  of	  off-­‐farm	   income	   to	   total	  household	   income,	  dummies	  for	   being	   in	   the	   lowest,	   second	   lowest,	   second	   highest,	   highest	   quartiles	   of	   leverage,	   share	   of	   farm	  income	   from	   crop	   production,	   crop	   income	   share	   squared,	   share	   of	   crop	   revenue	   from	   the	   primary	  crop,	  log	  of	  previous	  year’s	  farm	  sales,	  log	  farm	  revenue	  squared,	  and	  a	  measure	  of	  crop	  diversification	  (entropy).	   Standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses.	   Single	   asterisk	   (*)	   indicates	   significance	   at	   the	   90th	  percentile,	   double	   asterisks	   (**)	   indicate	   significance	   at	   the	   95th	   percentile,	   triple	   asterisks	   (***)	  indicate	  significance	  at	  the	  99th	  percentile.	  	  	  
II.	  Second-­‐Stage	  Regression	  Table	  19	  reports	  the	  results	  for	  the	  second-­‐stage	  regressions.	  Interestingly,	  the	  2SLS	  estimate	   for	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   on	   marketing	   contracts	  adoption	   is	   much	   different	   from	   the	   above	   OLS	   estimate:	   both	   the	   direction	   and	  magnitude	   have	   changed.	   In	   the	   2SLS	   estimation,	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   is	  found	   to	   have	   a	   negative	   influence	   on	   farmers’	   adoption	   decisions	   on	   marketing	  contracts:	   for	   the	   “all-­‐farms”	   sample,	   switching	   from	   uninsured	   to	   insured	   would	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lower	   the	   likelihood	   to	   adopt	   marketing	   contracts	   by	   26	   percentage	   points.	   This	  provides	   evidence	   for	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   discussed	   in	   section	   6.2,	   in	   other	  words,	  after	  removing	  the	  endogenous	  component,	  crop	  insurance	  is	  likely	  to	  crowd	  out	  the	  use	   of	   marketing	   contracts	   by	   farmers.	   This	   indicates	   a	   positive	   bias	   in	   the	   OLS	  estimation.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   this	   positive	   bias	   might	   result	   from	   the	   positive	  influence	   of	   risk	   aversion	   on	   both	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   and	   marketing	  contract	  adoption.	  For	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample,	  the	  “crowding-­‐out”	  effect	  is	  even	   stronger:	   a	   one	   percentage	   point	   change	   in	   the	   likelihood	   to	   purchase	   crop	  insurance	   would	   decrease	   the	   likelihood	   to	   adopt	   marketing	   contracts	   by	   1.89	  percentage	  points.	  This	  makes	  sense	  since	  as	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  4,	  most	  of	  the	  farms	  in	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample	  are	  located	  in	  the	  Midwest,	  where	  revenue-­‐based	  insurance	  is	  the	  dominant	  type	  of	  insurance	  adopted.	  According	  to	  earlier	  simulation	  studies,	   revenue	   insurance	   and	   forward	   pricing	   are	   substitutes,	   while	   yield-­‐based	  insurance	   is	   complementary	   to	   forward	   pricing;	   therefore,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   that	   the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  marketing	  contracts	  is	  more	  negative	  for	  corn/soybeans	  farms,	  on	  which	  revenue	  insurance	  is	  dominantly	  adopted.	  	  Notably,	   the	   IV	   estimator	   only	   recovers	   the	   local	   average	   treatment	   effect	   (LATE),	  that	   is,	   the	  estimate	   is	  only	   informative	  about	   farmers	  whose	  adoption	  decisions	  on	  crop	  insurance	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  county-­‐level	  loss-­‐risk,	  which	  reflects	  the	  actuarial	  performance	   of	   crop	   insurance	   pricing	   in	   an	   individual	   county;	   it	   does	   not	   tell	  anything	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  crop	  insurance	  on	  marketing	  contract	  use	  among	  those	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who	   would	   either	   always	   or	   never	   purchase	   crop	   insurance	   regardless	   of	   the	  actuarial	  soundness	  of	  insurance	  pricing.	  	  	  Using	   an	   IV	   estimating	   strategy	  does	  not	  dramatically	   affect	   the	   estimates	   for	  most	  other	   covariates	   except	   for	   slightly	   changing	   the	   point	   estimates.	   One	   education	  variable	   (which	   indicates	   having	   high	   school	   diploma	   or	   some	   college)	   becomes	  statistically	   significant	   in	   the	   IV	   regressions.	   Age	   losses	   significance	   for	   the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample	  with	  loss-­‐risk	  as	  the	  instrument.	  	  	  
Table	  19.	  Second-­‐Stage	  Results,	  Extensive	  Margin	  
Dependent	  Variable	   Any	  Marketing	  Contracts	  
	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Crop	  Insurance	   -­‐1.057*	   -­‐0.261**	   0.534	   -­‐1.889**	  
	   (0.629)	   (0.126)	   (0.977)	   (0.886)	  
Age	   -­‐0.00559**	   -­‐0.00566***	   -­‐0.00612**	   -­‐0.00359	  
	   (0.00220)	   (0.00159)	   (0.00238)	   (0.00424)	  
Age2	   0.0000203	   0.0000306**	   0.0000410	   -­‐0.0000156	  
	   (0.0000216)	   (0.0000146)	   (0.0000300)	   (0.0000430)	  
Experience	   0.00387*	   0.00137	   -­‐0.00148	   0.00103	  
	   (0.00225)	   (0.000873)	   (0.00148)	   (0.00223)	  
Experience2	   -­‐0.0000382*	   -­‐0.0000222*	   -­‐0.000000501	   0.0000324	  
	   (0.0000211)	   (0.0000124)	   (0.0000209)	   (0.0000336)	  
High	  School	  &	   0.158*	   0.0561***	   -­‐0.0453	   0.291**	  
	  	  Some	  College	   (0.0814)	   (0.0187)	   (0.136)	   (0.126)	  
College	  &	   0.214**	   0.0945***	   -­‐0.0260	   0.388**	  
	  	  Beyond	   (0.0956)	   (0.0216)	   (0.168)	   (0.154)	  
Off-­‐farm	   -­‐0.00688***	   -­‐0.00484***	   -­‐0.00422	   -­‐0.00877**	  
	  	  Income	   (0.00253)	   (0.00144)	   (0.00276)	   (0.00429)	  
Leverage_1	   -­‐0.313***	   -­‐0.180***	   -­‐0.0540	   -­‐0.488***	  
	   (0.105)	   (0.0225)	   (0.175)	   (0.160)	  
Leverage_2	   -­‐0.168***	   -­‐0.108***	   -­‐0.0571	   -­‐0.273***	  
	   (0.0485)	   (0.0115)	   (0.0874)	   (0.0807)	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Table	  19	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  
Leverage_3	   -­‐0.0649***	   -­‐0.0389***	   -­‐0.0132	   -­‐0.108***	  
	   (0.0219)	   (0.00696)	   (0.0389)	   (0.0377)	  
Crop	  Income	   0.498***	   0.338***	   0.186	   0.640***	  
	  	  Share	   (0.128)	   (0.0277)	   (0.184)	   (0.169)	  
Crop	  Income	   -­‐0.158***	   -­‐0.108***	   -­‐0.0591	   -­‐0.197***	  
	  	  Share2	   (0.0405)	   (0.00900)	   (0.0559)	   (0.0515)	  
Primary	  Crop	   -­‐0.423***	   -­‐0.319***	   -­‐0.153	   -­‐0.713***	  
	  	  Revenue	  Share	   (0.0847)	   (0.0220)	   (0.227)	   (0.209)	  
Revenue	   -­‐0.101***	   -­‐0.0670***	   -­‐0.0196	   -­‐0.126***	  
	   (0.0271)	   (0.00610)	   (0.0431)	   (0.0397)	  
Revenue2	   0.00997***	   0.00638***	   0.00188	   0.0132***	  
	   (0.00285)	   (0.000597)	   (0.00458)	   (0.00417)	  
Entropy	   -­‐0.347***	   -­‐0.227***	   -­‐0.162	   -­‐0.487***	  
	   (0.0999)	   (0.0295)	   (0.135)	   (0.133)	  
2006	   0.0283**	   0.0350***	   0.0354*	   -­‐0.00324	  
	   (0.0118)	   (0.00777)	   (0.0189)	   (0.0253)	  
2007	   0.128**	   0.0665***	   -­‐0.00420	   0.192**	  
	   (0.0514)	   (0.0153)	   (0.0810)	   (0.0786)	  
2008	   0.157***	   0.128***	   0.104***	   0.187***	  
	   (0.0254)	   (0.00916)	   (0.0354)	   (0.0371)	  
2009	   0.0554***	   0.0340***	   0.0159	   0.0705**	  
	   (0.0201)	   (0.00858)	   (0.0247)	   (0.0292)	  
2010	   0.0783***	   0.0770***	   0.0630***	   0.0761***	  
	   (0.0110)	   (0.00789)	   (0.0119)	   (0.0209)	  
2011	   0.121***	   0.106***	   0.0750***	   0.104***	  
	   (0.0162)	   (0.00852)	   (0.0165)	   (0.0246)	  
Observations	   45,393	   45,408	   25,026	   25,032	  
R-­‐squared	   -­‐0.824	   0.047	   0.006	   -­‐2.634	  
Instrument	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	  Notes:	  Both	  state	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects	  are	  applied.	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  the	  “all	  farms”	  sample,	  column	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample.	  In	  column	  (1)	  and	  (3),	  the	  loss	  ratio	  from	  last	  year	  is	  used	  as	  an	  instrument;	  in	  column	  (2)	  and	  (4),	  the	  instrument	  is	  “loss-­‐risk”.	  Independent	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  a	  dummy	  for	  adopting	  crop	  insurance,	  age,	  age	   squared,	   experience	   in	   years,	   experience	   squared,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	   high	   school	   or	  attending	   some	   college,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	   college	   or	   attending/completing	   graduate	   school,	  ratio	  of	  off-­‐farm	   income	   to	   total	  household	   income,	  dummies	   for	  being	   in	   the	   lowest,	   second	   lowest,	  second	  highest,	  highest	  quartiles	  of	  leverage,	  share	  of	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production,	  crop	  income	  share	  squared,	  share	  of	  crop	  revenue	  from	  the	  primary	  crop,	  log	  of	  previous	  year’s	  farm	  sales,	  log	  farm	  revenue	   squared,	   and	   a	   measure	   of	   crop	   diversification	   (entropy).	   Standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses.	  Single	   asterisk	   (*)	   indicates	   significance	   at	   the	   90th	   percentile,	   double	   asterisks	   (**)	   indicate	  significance	  at	  the	  95th	  percentile,	  triple	  asterisks	  (***)	  indicate	  significance	  at	  the	  99th	  percentile.	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Intensive	  Margin	  Conditional	  on	  having	  crop	  insurance,	  the	  intensive	  margin	  is	  also	  examined.	  Results	  for	  both	  the	  first-­‐	  and	  second-­‐stage	  regressions	  are	  reported.	   	  Table	  20	  contains	  the	  first-­‐stage	  results;	  lagged	  loss	  ratio	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  weak	  instrument	  for	  both	  the	  “all-­‐farms”	  sample	  and	  the	  “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample.	  	  	  	  
Table	  20.	  First-­‐Stage	  Results,	  Intensive	  Margin	  
Dependent	  Variable	   Crop	  Insurance	  Participation	  	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   0.00582	   	   0.00545	   	  
	   (0.00417)	   	   (0.00634)	   	  
Loss-­‐Risk	   	   0.0426***	   	   0.0347***	  
	   	   (0.00700)	   	   (0.0102)	  
Age	   0.00431**	   0.00446**	   0.00506*	   0.00507*	  
	   (0.00210)	   (0.00209)	   (0.00275)	   (0.00275)	  
Age2	   -­‐0.0000489**	   -­‐0.0000502**	   -­‐0.0000578**	   -­‐0.0000578**	  
	   (0.0000198)	   (0.0000198)	   (0.0000261)	   (0.0000260)	  
Experience	   0.000770	   0.000751	   -­‐0.00111	   -­‐0.00108	  
	   (0.00105)	   (0.00105)	   (0.00137)	   (0.00137)	  
Experience2	   0.00000393	   0.00000442	   0.0000345	   0.0000341	  
	   (0.0000170)	   (0.0000170)	   (0.0000222)	   (0.0000222)	  
High	  School	  &	   0.0456***	   0.0451***	   0.0801***	   0.0796***	  
	  	  Some	  College	   (0.0144)	   (0.0144)	   (0.0197)	   (0.0197)	  
College	  &	   0.0711***	   0.0707***	   0.106***	   0.106***	  
	  	  Beyond	   (0.0150)	   (0.0150)	   (0.0205)	   (0.0204)	  
Off-­‐farm	   -­‐0.00100	   -­‐0.00105	   0.00179	   0.00187	  
	  	  Income	   (0.00161)	   (0.00161)	   (0.00231)	   (0.00231)	  
Leverage_1	   -­‐0.140***	   -­‐0.142***	   -­‐0.152***	   -­‐0.152***	  
	   (0.0121)	   (0.0121)	   (0.0163)	   (0.0163)	  
Leverage_2	   -­‐0.0641***	   -­‐0.0646***	   -­‐0.0812***	   -­‐0.0814***	  
	   (0.00786)	   (0.00786)	   (0.0108)	   (0.0108)	  
Leverage_3	   -­‐0.0306***	   -­‐0.0304***	   -­‐0.0382***	   -­‐0.0374***	  
	   (0.00640)	   (0.00639)	   (0.00842)	   (0.00842)	  
Crop	  Income	   0.0844***	   0.0855***	   0.0846***	   0.0860***	  
	  	  Share	   (0.0159)	   (0.0159)	   (0.0212)	   (0.0211)	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Table	  20	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  
Crop	  Income	   -­‐0.0288***	   -­‐0.0288***	   -­‐0.0278***	   -­‐0.0279***	  
	  	  Share2	   (0.00580)	   (0.00580)	   (0.00769)	   (0.00769)	  
Primary	  Crop	   -­‐0.0714***	   -­‐0.0756***	   -­‐0.147***	   -­‐0.152***	  
	  	  Revenue	  Share	   (0.0212)	   (0.0212)	   (0.0299)	   (0.0299)	  
Revenue	   -­‐0.0265***	   -­‐0.0263***	   -­‐0.0303***	   -­‐0.0301***	  
	   (0.00399)	   (0.00399)	   (0.00525)	   (0.00524)	  
Revenue2	   0.00263***	   0.00262***	   0.00302***	   0.00301***	  
	   (0.000237)	   (0.000237)	   (0.000312)	   (0.000311)	  
Entropy	   -­‐0.117***	   -­‐0.124***	   -­‐0.0932**	   -­‐0.104**	  
	   (0.0325)	   (0.0325)	   (0.0427)	   (0.0428)	  
2006	   -­‐0.0153	   -­‐0.0164	   -­‐0.0130	   -­‐0.0139	  
	   (0.0104)	   (0.0104)	   (0.0146)	   (0.0145)	  
2007	   0.0842***	   0.0848***	   0.0974***	   0.0968***	  
	   (0.0147)	   (0.0147)	   (0.0202)	   (0.0201)	  
2008	   0.0441***	   0.0439***	   0.0408***	   0.0404***	  
	   (0.0100)	   (0.00999)	   (0.0138)	   (0.0137)	  
2009	   0.0394***	   0.0393***	   0.0350**	   0.0358**	  
	   (0.0106)	   (0.0106)	   (0.0144)	   (0.0143)	  
2010	   0.0338***	   0.0300***	   0.0344**	   0.0306**	  
	   (0.0107)	   (0.0103)	   (0.0143)	   (0.0137)	  
2011	   0.0451***	   0.0454***	   0.0422***	   0.0427***	  
	   (0.0105)	   (0.0105)	   (0.0144)	   (0.0144)	  
Observations	   17,278	   17,279	   9,509	   9,509	  
R-­‐squared	   0.049	   0.051	   0.066	   0.067	  
F-­‐statistic	   1.95	   37.02	   0.74	   11.56	  
Probability>F	   0.1627	   0.0000	   0.3905	   0.0007	  
Instrument	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	  	  Notes:	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  the	  “all	  farms”	  sample,	  column	  (3)	  and	  (4)	  report	  the	  results	   for	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample.	   In	   column	   (1)	  and	   (3),	   the	   loss	   ratio	   from	   last	  year	   is	  used	   as	   an	   instrument;	   in	   column	   (2)	   and	   (4),	   the	   instrument	   is	   “loss-­‐risk”.	   Other	   independent	  variables	  are	  defined	  as	  follows:	  age,	  age	  squared,	  experience	  in	  years,	  experience	  squared,	  a	  dummy	  for	   completing	   high	   school	   or	   attending	   some	   college,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	   college	   or	  attending/completing	  graduate	   school,	   ratio	  of	  off-­‐farm	   income	   to	   total	  household	   income,	  dummies	  for	   being	   in	   the	   lowest,	   second	   lowest,	   second	   highest,	   highest	   quartiles	   of	   leverage,	   share	   of	   farm	  income	   from	   crop	   production,	   crop	   income	   share	   squared,	   share	   of	   crop	   revenue	   from	   the	   primary	  crop,	  log	  of	  previous	  year’s	  farm	  sales,	  log	  farm	  revenue	  squared,	  and	  a	  measure	  of	  crop	  diversification	  (entropy).	   Standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses.	   Single	   asterisk	   (*)	   indicates	   significance	   at	   the	   90th	  percentile,	   double	   asterisks	   (**)	   indicate	   significance	   at	   the	   95th	   percentile,	   triple	   asterisks	   (***)	  indicate	  significance	  at	  the	  99th	  percentile.	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Table	  21.	  Second-­‐Stage	  Results,	  Intensive	  Margin	  
Dependent	  Variable	   Fraction	  of	  Production	  Contracted	  
	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
Crop	  Insurance	   -­‐1.083	   0.439***	   0.583	   0.520*	  
	   (0.941)	   (0.150)	   (1.131)	   (0.275)	  
Age	   0.000837	   -­‐0.00576***	   -­‐0.00709	   -­‐0.00678**	  
	   (0.00493)	   (0.00201)	   (0.00630)	   (0.00292)	  
Age2	   -­‐0.00000531	   0.0000695***	   0.0000806	   0.0000770***	  
	   (0.0000532)	   (0.0000195)	   (0.0000698)	   (0.0000290)	  
Experience	   -­‐0.00207	   -­‐0.00322***	   -­‐0.00167	   -­‐0.00174	  
	   (0.00155)	   (0.000959)	   (0.00183)	   (0.00132)	  
Experience2	   0.0000253	   0.0000190	   -­‐0.00000206	   0.000000114	  
	   (0.0000227)	   (0.0000155)	   (0.0000446)	   (0.0000228)	  
High	  School	  &	   0.0587	   -­‐0.0104	   -­‐0.0378	   -­‐0.0327	  
	  	  Some	  College	   (0.0468)	   (0.0148)	   (0.0923)	   (0.0287)	  
College	  &	   0.0955	   -­‐0.0123	   -­‐0.0377	   -­‐0.0310	  
	  	  Beyond	   (0.0695)	   (0.0173)	   (0.121)	   (0.0348)	  
Off-­‐farm	   -­‐0.000300	   0.00126	   -­‐0.00190	   -­‐0.00178	  
	  	  Income	   (0.00233)	   (0.00147)	   (0.00301)	   (0.00221)	  
Leverage_1	   -­‐0.141	   0.0732***	   0.0988	   0.0892**	  
	   (0.133)	   (0.0237)	   (0.172)	   (0.0444)	  
Leverage_2	   -­‐0.0675	   0.0301**	   0.0374	   0.0323	  
	   (0.0613)	   (0.0120)	   (0.0925)	   (0.0245)	  
Leverage_3	   -­‐0.0515*	   -­‐0.00487	   -­‐0.00549	   -­‐0.00790	  
	   (0.0300)	   (0.00741)	   (0.0440)	   (0.0131)	  
Crop	  Income	   -­‐0.0494	   -­‐0.178***	   -­‐0.187*	   -­‐0.182***	  
	  	  Share	   (0.0822)	   (0.0192)	   (0.0977)	   (0.0305)	  
Crop	  Income	   -­‐0.0221	   0.0218***	   0.0199	   0.0182*	  
	  	  Share2	   (0.0282)	   (0.00681)	   (0.0322)	   (0.0105)	  
Primary	  Crop	   -­‐0.198***	   -­‐0.0899***	   0.0540	   0.0448	  
	  	  Revenue	  Share	   (0.0723)	   (0.0220)	   (0.168)	   (0.0490)	  
Revenue	   -­‐0.0482*	   -­‐0.00782	   0.00366	   0.00175	  
	   (0.0255)	   (0.00538)	   (0.0346)	   (0.00967)	  
Revenue2	   0.00403	   0.0000445	   -­‐0.00102	   -­‐0.000832	  
	   (0.00249)	   (0.000448)	   (0.00342)	   (0.000879)	  
Entropy	   -­‐0.382***	   -­‐0.207***	   -­‐0.361***	   -­‐0.367***	  
	   (0.117)	   (0.0342)	   (0.112)	   (0.0472)	  
2006	   0.0361*	   0.0616***	   0.0819***	   0.0810***	  
	   (0.0207)	   (0.00977)	   (0.0214)	   (0.0141)	  
2007	   0.166**	   0.0398**	   0.0127	   0.0187	  
	   (0.0804)	   (0.0182)	   (0.110)	   (0.0323)	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Table	  21	  (cont.)	   	   	   	   	  
2008	   0.0906**	   0.0248**	   0.0658	   0.0683***	  
	   (0.0428)	   (0.0112)	   (0.0465)	   (0.0167)	  
2009	   0.0732*	   0.0113	   0.0495	   0.0518***	  
	   (0.0407)	   (0.0114)	   (0.0436)	   (0.0167)	  
2010	   0.0978***	   0.0521***	   0.0942**	   0.0962***	  
	   (0.0314)	   (0.0104)	   (0.0373)	   (0.0154)	  
2011	   0.119***	   0.0490***	   0.0854*	   0.0881***	  
	   (0.0452)	   (0.0117)	   (0.0501)	   (0.0179)	  
Observations	   17,278	   17,279	   9,509	   9,509	  
R-­‐squared	   -­‐1.692	   -­‐0.289	   -­‐0.453	   -­‐0.345	  
Instrument	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	   Lagged	  Loss	  Ratio	   Loss	  Risk	  Notes:	  Both	  state	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects	  are	  applied.	  Columns	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  report	  the	  results	  for	  the	  “all	  farms”	   sample,	   columns	   (3)	   and	   (4)	   report	   the	   results	   for	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample.	   In	  columns	  (1)	  and	  (3),	  the	  loss	  ratio	  from	  last	  year	  is	  used	  as	  an	  instrument;	  in	  columns	  (2)	  and	  (4),	  the	  instrument	   is	   “loss-­‐risk”.	   Independent	   variables	   are	   defined	   as	   follows:	   a	   dummy	   for	   adopting	   crop	  insurance,	   age,	   age	   squared,	   experience	   in	   years,	   experience	   squared,	   a	   dummy	   for	   completing	   high	  school	  or	  attending	  some	  college,	  a	  dummy	  for	  completing	  college	  or	  attending/completing	  graduate	  school,	   ratio	  of	  off-­‐farm	   income	   to	   total	  household	   income,	  dummies	   for	  being	   in	   the	   lowest,	   second	  lowest,	  second	  highest,	  highest	  quartiles	  of	  leverage,	  share	  of	  farm	  income	  from	  crop	  production,	  crop	  income	  share	  squared,	  share	  of	  crop	  revenue	  from	  the	  primary	  crop,	  log	  of	  previous	  year’s	  farm	  sales,	  log	   farm	   revenue	   squared,	   and	   a	   measure	   of	   crop	   diversification	   (entropy).	   Standard	   errors	   in	  parentheses.	   Single	   asterisk	   (*)	   indicates	   significance	   at	   the	   90th	   percentile,	   double	   asterisks	   (**)	  indicate	   significance	   at	   the	   95th	   percentile,	   triple	   asterisks	   (***)	   indicate	   significance	   at	   the	   99th	  percentile.	  
	  
	  
6.4.5	  Wu-­‐Hausman	  test	  In	  order	  to	  test	  for	  the	  endogeneity	  of	  crop	  insurance	  adoption,	  a	  Wu-­‐Hausman	  test	  is	  conducted	   for	   both	   samples;	   it	   is	   essentially	   a	   test	   of	   whether	   the	   2SLS	   and	   OLS	  coefficients	  are	  equal.	  To	  conduct	  the	  Wu-­‐Hausman	  test,	  I	  first	  perform	  the	  first	  stage	  regression:	  	   𝐶𝐼!" =   𝜑 +   𝜌𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!" + 𝜏𝐹!" +   𝜂𝑋!" + 𝑣!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  	  where	  all	  the	  terms	  are	  as	  defined	  earlier.	  
	  79	  
Then	  I	  get	  the	  residuals	  CI_res,	  and	  perform	  an	  augmented	  regression:	  	   𝑀𝐶!" =    𝑐! +   𝑐!𝐶𝐼!" + 𝑐!𝐶𝐼_𝑟𝑒𝑠!" + 𝑐!𝐹!" + 𝑐!𝑋!" + 𝑧!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  or	   𝑀𝐶𝑞𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒!" =   𝑑! +   𝑑!𝐶𝐼!" + 𝑑!𝐶𝐼_𝑟𝑒𝑠!" + 𝑑!𝐹!" + 𝑑!𝑋!" + 𝜂!" +   𝛿! + 𝜔!	  	  Estimates	   of	   the	   first-­‐stage	   residuals	   (CI_res)	   from	   the	   augmented	   regressions	   are	  displayed	  in	  Table	  22.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  CI_res	  are	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero	  in	  all	  the	  augmented	  regressions,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  OLS	  estimate	  is	  not	  consistent	  and	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  use	  an	  instrumental	  variable.	  	  
Table	  22.	  Augmented	  Regressions	  for	  Wu-­‐Hausman	  Test	  
Dependent	  Variable	   Any	  Marketing	  Contracts	   Fraction	  of	  Production	  Contracted	  
	  
All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	   All	  Farms	   Corn/Soybeans	  Farms	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  
CI_res	   0.369***	   1.989***	   -­‐0.466***	   -­‐0.523**	  
	  
(0.119)	   (0.432)	   (0.129)	   (0.229)	  
Observations	   45,408	   25,032	   17,281	   9,512	  





6.5	  Summary	  Empirical	   analyses	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   crop	   insurance	  participation	  on	   farmers’	   use	  of	  marketing	   contracts	   are	   conducted	   using	   both	   OLS	   and	   2SLS	   approach.	   Both	   the	  extensive	   margin	   and	   the	   intensive	   margin	   are	   examined	   separately	   for	   two	  samples—the	   “all	   farms”	   sample,	  which	   includes	   farms	   growing	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	  twelve	   crops	   (barley,	   canola,	   corn,	   cotton,	   oats,	   peanuts,	   potatoes,	   rice,	   sorghum,	  soybeans,	   sugar	   beets	   and	   wheat);	   and	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample,	   which	  keeps	  only	  farms	  primarily	  producing	  corn	  or	  soybeans	  (farms	  obtaining	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  total	  crop	  revenue	  from	  corn	  or	  soybeans).	  	  Estimates	  are	  different	  using	  the	  different	  approaches.	  A	  Wu-­‐Hausman	  test	  suggests	  that	   the	   OLS	   estimate	   is	   not	   consistent	   and	   that	   the	   2SLS	   approach	   is	   more	  appropriate.	   There	   is	   positive	   estimation	   bias	   for	   the	   extensive	   margin;	   for	   the	  intensive	   margin,	   the	   bias	   is	   negative.	   The	   2SLS	   estimation	   indicates	   a	   negative	  influence	  of	  crop	  insurance	  participation	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts,	  and	  this	   influence	   is	   stronger	   for	   corn/soybean	   farms.	   This	   result	   suggests	   a	   “crowding	  out”	  effect	  of	  the	  government	  subsidized	  crop	  insurance	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts,	   which	   is	   a	   private	   risk	   management	   strategy.	   Conditional	   on	   having	   a	  marketing	   contract,	   a	   positive	   effect	   of	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   is	   detected	   for	  the	   intensive	  margin	  using	  the	  2SLS	  method.	  This	  result	   is	  reasonable	  because	  crop	  insurance	   could	   provide	   resources	   to	  meet	   delivery	   obligations	  when	   a	   production	  shortfall	   occurs	   (Collins	  &	   Bulut,	   2011).	   Thus,	   insured	   farmers	  would	   be	  willing	   to	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7.1	  Summary	  and	  Review	  This	   thesis	   examines	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   adoption	   on	   farmers’	   use	   of	  marketing	   contracts.	   Crop	   insurance	   and	   contracting	   are	   both	   important	   strategies	  utilized	  by	  farmers	  in	  the	  U.S.	  to	  manage	  risks.	  Crop	  insurance	  is	  federally	  subsidized,	  while	   marketing	   contract	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   forward	   pricing	   strategy	   available	   from	   the	  market.	   Crop	   insurance	   might	   crowd	   out	   the	   use	   of	   marketing	   contracts,	   which	   is	  analogous	   to	   the	   impact	   of	  Medicaid	  program	  on	  private	   health	   insurance	   found	   in	  previous	   literature.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   crop	   insurance	   could	   provide	   resources	   to	  meet	   delivery	   obligations	   of	   a	  marketing	   contract	   in	   case	   of	   a	   production	   shortfall	  (Collins	   &	   Bulut,	   2011).	   From	   this	   perspective,	   having	   crop	   insurance	   would	  encourage	  the	  use	  of	  marketing	  contracts.	  	  	  Earlier	   studies	   used	   utility-­‐maximizing	   models	   to	   examine	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	  insurance	   on	   forward	   pricing.	   Overall,	   results	   suggested	   that	   revenue-­‐based	  insurance	  substitutes	  for	  forward	  pricing,	  whereas	  a	  yield-­‐based	  policy	  and	  forward	  pricing	  are	  complementary	  to	  each	  other.	  The	  preceding	  studies	  are	  based	  on	  optimal	  hedging	  models;	   in	   contrast,	   this	   thesis	   investigates	   the	   relationship	   between	   crop	  insurance	   adoption	   and	   farmers’	   actual	   forward	   pricing	   behaviors,	   thus	   is	   not	  constraint	  by	  theoretical	  models.	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Using	  pooled	  ARMS	  data	  from	  2005	  to	  2011,	  descriptive	  analyses	  were	  presented	  in	  Chapter	   5	   for	   two	   different	   samples—the	   “all	   farms”	   sample,	  which	   includes	   farms	  growing	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	   twelve	   crops	   (barley,	   canola,	   corn,	   cotton,	   oats,	   peanut,	  potato,	   rice,	   sorghum,	   soybean,	   sugar	   beets	   and	   wheat);	   and	   the	   “corn/soybeans	  farms”	  sample,	  which	  keeps	  only	  farms	  primarily	  producing	  corn	  or	  soybeans	  (farms	  obtaining	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	   total	   crop	   revenue	   from	   corn	   or	   soybeans).	   Two	  important	   implications	   are	   derived	   from	   the	   summary	   statistics.	   First,	   farmers’	  decision	   to	   adopt	  marketing	   contracts	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   their	   participation	   in	  crop	  insurance,	  whereas	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  share	  of	  production	  contracted	  and	  crop	  insurance	  is	  different	  for	  different	  samples.	  For	  the	  “all-­‐farms”	  sample,	  the	  quantity	   contracted	   tend	   to	   be	   negatively	   correlated	   with	   crop	   insurance	  participation,	   while	   for	   the	   “corn/soybeans	   farms”	   sample,	   such	   correlation	  disappears.	  Second,	   insured	  and	  uninsured	   farms	  are	  systematically	  different	  based	  on	  most	  observable	  characteristics,	   suggesting	   that	   they	  are	  also	  different	  based	  on	  un-­‐observables.	  As	  a	  result,	  crop	  insurance	  participation	  is	  potentially	  endogenous.	  	  	  Further	  empirical	  analyses	  on	  the	  extensive	  and	  intensive	  margins	  were	  conducted	  in	  Chapter	  6	  using	  both	  the	  OLS	  and	  the	  2SLS	  approach;	  a	  Wu-­‐Hauman	  test	  suggests	  that	  the	   latter	   is	   more	   appropriate.	   Results	   of	   the	   2SLS	   regressions	   showed	   that	   crop	  insurance	   participation	   negatively	   affects	   the	   adoption	   of	   marketing	   contracts	  (extensive	  margin),	  and	   this	  effect	   is	   stronger	   for	  corn/soybeans	   farms.	  Conditional	  on	   having	   a	  marketing	   contract,	   a	   positive	   effect	   of	   crop	   insurance	   participation	   is	  detected	  for	  the	  intensive	  margin.	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  The	   regression	   results	   indicate	   a	   “crowding	   out”	   effect	   of	   the	   governmentally	  subsidized	  crop	  insurance	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts,	  which	  is	  a	  private	  risk	  management	   strategy.	   However,	   the	   intensive	  margin	   is	   positively	   affected	   by	  crop	   insurance	  participation.	  Conditional	  on	  having	  at	   least	  one	  marketing	  contract,	  insured	   farmers	   would	   be	   willing	   to	   place	   more	   of	   their	   crop	   production	   under	  marketing	   contract	   than	   those	  who	   are	   uninsured	   because	   crop	   insurance	   reduces	  the	   losses	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   production	   shortfall	   by	   providing	   resources	   to	   meet	  delivery	  obligations.	  	  
	  
7.2	  Significance	  and	  Implications	  In	   light	  of	  the	  evidence	  provided	  in	  this	  thesis,	  crop	  insurance	  is	   likely	  to	  substitute	  for	   the	  adoption	  of	  marketing	  contracts.	  However,	  among	   those	  who	  use	  marketing	  contracts,	  participation	  in	  crop	  insurance	  will	  encourage	  farmers	  to	  place	  more	  of	  the	  crop	  production	   under	   contracts.	   Since	   late	   2011,	   the	  RMA	  has	   been	   implementing	  adjustments	   to	   premium	   rates	   in	   a	   “phase	   in”	   approach	   to	   make	   the	   rates	   more	  actuarially	   sound.	   In	   general,	   “premium	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   decrease	   in	   core	   growing	  areas	   and	   increase	   elsewhere”	   (USDA-­‐RMA,	   2013).	   This	   may	   further	   influence	  farmers’	   use	   of	   marketing/forward	   contracts,	   and	   the	   impacts	   will	   be	   varying	   by	  county	  and	  crop.	  	  To	  my	   knowledge,	   this	   study	   is	   the	   first	   to	   empirically	   explore	   the	   impact	   of	   crop	  insurance	   on	   farmers’	   actual	   forward	   pricing	   decisions	   while	   taking	   into	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consideration	   the	   endogeneity	   of	   crop	   insurance	   participation.	   The	   findings	   of	   this	  study	  should	  help	  enhance	  the	  understanding	  of	  farmers’	  risk	  managing	  behaviors,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interactions	  between	  public	  and	  private	  risk	  management	  tools	  in	  practice.	  It	  should	  be	  valuable	  to	  policy	  makers	  by	  providing	  useful	  information	  for	  estimating	  the	   impact	   of	   crop	   insurance	   policies	   on	   the	   private	   risk	   management	   market.	  Agriculture	   consultants,	   farm-­‐related	   organizations	   and	   companies	   can	   also	   use	  information	   to	   adapt	   their	   marketing	   advisory	   services	   and	   educational/training	  programs	  to	  the	  specific	  needs	  of	  their	  client.	  Those	  findings	  may	  also	  be	  helpful	  for	  the	   promotion	   of	   risk	   management	   instruments	   in	   regions	   or	   countries	   where	  agricultural	  risk	  management	  is	  less	  developed.	  	  	  
7.3	  Limitations	  and	  Future	  Work	  There	   are	   a	   few	   limitations	   to	   this	   research.	   First,	   despite	   of	   its	   nationally	  representativeness	   and	   comprehensiveness,	   the	   ARMS	   data	   do	   not	   contain	   details	  about	   farmers’	   use	   of	   crop	   insurance,	   information	   such	   as	   the	   types	   of	   insurance,	  crops	  covered	  under	  insurance	  or	  the	  coverage	  level	  is	  not	  available.	  Therefore,	  only	  the	  farm-­‐level	  insurance	  adoption	  dummy	  could	  be	  utilized.	  With	  more	  information,	  future	  analyses	  could	  be	  done	  at	  the	  crop	  level,	  and	  the	  impacts	  of	  different	  types	  of	  crop	  insurance	  might	  be	  distinguished	  so	  that	  the	  estimates	  are	  more	  accurate.	  	  Second,	  this	  thesis	  only	  focuses	  on	  marketing	  contract	  use	  to	  represent	  farmers’	  use	  of	  private-­‐market	  risk	  management	  strategies.	  More	  risk	  management	   tools	  such	  as	  futures	  and	  options	  could	  be	  included	  in	  future	  work.	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